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ABSTRACT
This report focuses on four different mechanisms designed to provide marginalized groups in Africa with 
improved legislative representation at the national level. These special representation mechanisms include: 
proportional representation, guaranteed minority seating, advisory bodies and affirmative gerrymandering1. 
These tools appear a beneficial means through which nations may eliminate discrimination, better 
safeguard the interests of marginalized people, boost opportunity for political expression and place each 
member of society on equal footing. 
To situate this discussion in its proper context, the opening section of this paper will explore international 
law relating to the right of representation and present arguments both for and against the use of special 
representation mechanisms. This is followed by a brief discussion of the myriad problems that arise in 
attempting to address or characterize issues relating to marginalized groups in Africa. Turning to an 
analysis of the four specific mechanisms, this paper will examine numerous cases of African nations that 
have, in theory or practice, sought to employ proportional representation, guaranteed minority seating or 
advisory bodies as a means of introducing special representation. In addition, this section will discuss the 
function of demarcation, its historical roots, and impact on the political climate. Finally, this paper will 
offer some conclusions about the implications of the research and its findings as well as several policy 
suggestions. It is my hope that the information in this report will contribute to advancing a more equitable 
system of representation and its practical implementation in Africa. 
I am humbled by the work of those whose insights fill the pages below. 
Introduction
 “It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. 
No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”2
The legislature is considered the most fundamental arm of democratic governance. In its purest form it 
serves to secure the foundations of democracy by translating the will of people into the law of land. At its 
core, the legislature is a mirror of society’s soul. The question is how to ensure that the composition of the 
legislature and the decisions it makes are a true reflection of the will of all people whom this body is 
designed to represent. 
Legislative representation generally provides a means for people to express their will through 
representatives who bring their constituencies’ “concerns and aspirations” to government decisions and 
actions.3 This process pivots on voters electing representatives, who in turn are given authority through the 
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2electoral process and empowered by the people to make decisions and create laws in their best interests. 
This form of governance is understood as being the optimal system, since the only form of democracy more 
pure is the system of direct democracy, where every individual has the opportunity to participate directly in 
legislative decision making.4 Although perhaps ideal, direct democracy is generally impractical. Therefore, 
representative democracy is the next best structure as it ideally provides a form of government whereby 
people’s sovereignty is delegated to a body of elected persons who exercise authority for the benefit of the 
whole nation.5 Representative democracy relies on compromise whether to resolve conflict6 or design 
policies to address the needs of a nation. Arguably in its purest form, representative democracy can 
represent marginalized groups and larger populations alike.
Within the context of representational democracy there are a wide range of views concerning how best to 
represent marginalized groups in the decision making process. At one end of the spectrum, 
consociationalism, Arjund Liphart’s theory, asserts that peaceful coexistence cannot be ensured unless 
special constitutional measures recognize the corporate entity of ethnic groups and confer on them the right 
to separate representation and participation in public bodies.7 At the opposite end of the pole, 
integrationists, promulgate the idea that a political system in which all citizens participate can be created 
through incentives for cooperation and electoral laws that encourage inter-ethnic cooperation.8
It should be stated from the outset that the scope of this paper is limited to special mechanisms related to 
legislative representation, for practical purposes. This limitation is not meant to discount the merit of non-
legislative special representation tools—such as special ministries, non-governmental organizations, 
commissions and workgroups.9 That said special legislative representation, is unique as it specifically 
targets the organ whose very raison d’etre is to represent the entire population, as opposed to creating ad 
hoc or external structures in the manner of its non-legislative counterparts. With this departure point in 
mind, this report takes the position that legislative special representation may play a critical role in 
compensating marginalized groups for historical disadvantage and providing them with immediate 
opportunities to publicly and actively participate in the same institutions that are accessible to the 
mainstream, thereby correcting societal imbalance.  Indeed, the introduction of these tools may serve to 
effectively incorporate disenfranchised communities in the legislature, thereby potentially strengthening 
legislative representation as a whole. 
There is a tremendous amount of information within the following pages, and this paper includes the 
diverse perspectives of a number of great scholars as well as the author’s own observations. However, this 
report is not intended to convey the entire spectrum of thought on the subjects raised herein; rather it is 
intended to stimulate discussion, prompt further work in the area and hopefully inspire creative thinking. 
Public International Law
Public international law provides the legal foundation for affirmative rights applicable to all human beings. 
The roots of human rights, minority rights, the right to be free from discrimination, rights of expression, the 
right to self-determination, the right to participation and the right to take part in government can be 
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3identified in international doctrine.10 The right to equitable representation emerges from these enumerated 
rights. 11
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations declared “equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, the 
purpose of the international body to be thereby establishing the right to self-determination as a pillar of the 
international system.12 Elaborating upon the ideology embedded in the UN Charter, Article 15 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights specifically asserts the right to participate in public affairs and 
government.13 In addition, the UDHR expands the right to self-determination to include the pursuit of 
economic, social and cultural development. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both adopted in 1966, expand and 
make enforceable the rights initially set forth in the UN Charter and the UDHR. The language in Article 25 
of the ICCPR declares that every citizen has the right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives,” and “to vote and to be elected”.14 Though it does not mention 
minorities per se, it has been argued to the UN Committee on Human Rights that minorities should be read 
into the interpretation of this clause as they are understood to be “unrepresented or underrepresented 
[persons] in national political processes” due to their systematic exclusion or generally small population.15
This concept was affirmed and is currently encoded in international law. Article 1 of the ICESCR declares 
“all people have the right of self-determination”.16
In 1952, international law explicitly recognized “that everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his [or her] country directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives…in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”17
Inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR, the UN General Assembly passed the 1992 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.18 This document 
declares that minorities have the right “to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and 
pubic life,”19 and “to participate effectively in decisions on the national and where appropriate regional 
level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions which they live, in a manner not 
incompatible with national legislation”20 Other treaties have more specifically addressed categories of 
minorities such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child,21 the  Convention (No. 169) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries22 and the Convention on the Political Rights of 
10 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS art. 1.2 [hereinafter UN Charter].
11 UNIVERSIAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 15 [hereinafter UDHR].
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4Women,23 for example. In Article 11, the CRC provides that to comply with CITPTC governments shall 
“consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their 
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures 
which may affect them directly.” Article 6(a) further supports the notion of the right for marginalized 
groups to be politically represented. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination is also fundamental to this discussion insofar as Article 1.4 states: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain 
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, 
that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights 
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved.24
This provision has most commonly taken the form of affirmative action policies.25
Article 2.3 of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities is of particular interest because of the implicit 
qualifications it attaches to these positive rights.  While the intention of this document is to advance the 
rights of marginalized groups, it also serves to potentially isolate such groups by only out provisions to 
involve them in public participation only when issues may directly impact their specified group or regions 
where they live. The problem here is not the separate recognition of minorities it is but rather that the 
language is arguably insufficient in acknowledging that marginalized groups remain a part of the majority. 
To truly ensure marginalized people are protected, free from discrimination and able to meaningfully assert 
their right to self-determination, their voices also must be deemed relevant to society at large. The language 
in The Declaration on Minorities fails to open up sufficient space to allow minorities to share their 
worldviews while remaining a pillar of structuring the larger society. In turn this language creates a 
qualified right that seems colored more so by exclusion than integration. Nevertheless it must be noted that 
the CERD, a more significant and binding document, supports the use of special corrective measures. 
Regional instruments have added a context rich dimension that view international law through a historic 
and cultural lens. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights26 exemplifies the effort by African 
nations to further ingrain international law, specifically the UDHR, into the core of their societies. Though 
the African Charter makes no mention of minorities, the African Union, formerly the Organization for 
African Unity, has interpreted Article 19 of its Charter to require that states give information on  the 
“constitutional and statutory framework which seeks to protect the different sections of the national 
community.”27  It may be inferred from this directive that protecting disadvantaged groups is an intended 
objective of the Charter.
Other regional conventions have gone a step beyond articulating goals and ideologies to suggest specific 
measures that may be used to implement international law and regional aims in a practical manner. 
Addressing issues of political representation for marginalized groups, the Lund Recommendations on 
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5Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life28 serve to illustrate a potential device that may 
assist regional and national efforts to improve the status of potential marginalized populations. 
The main objective of the Lund Recommendations is to encourage effective participation of national 
minorities, which is identified as central to maintaining peaceful and democratic societies. The 
recommendations strive to facilitate the adoption of state-specific measures aimed at reducing tensions 
related to minorities and supporting mechanisms for inclusion.29 This document identifies participation in 
decision making, and electoral systems specifically, as means for ensuring that minority voices are 
represented at the national level of government. The Lund Recommendations further state that in order to 
ensure minority voices are heard, states may make “special arrangements” for special representation. To 
this end several different mechanisms, including reserving seats in parliament are specifically articulated.30
With respect to electoral systems, the Lund Recommendations suggest that proportional representation with 
lower numerical thresholds and geographic boundaries that facilitate equitable representation may be used 
to enhance inclusion of national minorities in governance. It further “encourages testing new and 
innovative regimes rather than specifying terms for altering existing arrangements.”31 The details of this 
document provide a rich framework for the African Union’s next steps to further encourage representation 
for marginalized groups in its member nation states. The Gaborone Declaration on Indigenous People and 
Minorities in Africa provides an example of efforts to increase regional policy in this capacity.32
Taken together, the international and regional declarations and treaties discussed above establish the 
foundation for the right of all persons to self-determination and participation in all dimensions of society 
affecting their lives and communities. These rights serve as a starting point for an inquiry into how 
minority rights are in fact manifested. From here one must look past the general principles of international 
law to the concrete representation mechanisms that have evolved in part from the basic right of 
representation as it pertains to minority groups. Ultimately to breath meaningful life into the spirit of article 
25 of the ICCPR, special processes and structures for political representation must necessarily exist.33
While the relationship between self-determination and legislative representation may be set out in 
international law, the tools of implementation are outside of the scope and powers of the UN. States are the 
subjects of international law and are accordingly charged with the responsibility of complying with that 
through the actions of national and local governments. Under international law the duty of the state to take 
remedial action in relation to minority groups can be understood as an affirmative duty to ensure that all its 
citizens have the ability to inform the decisions which may affect their present or future situations.
Consequently, the aforementioned international principles serve as a pillar for the arguments asserted 
below, but are not to be understood as the sole impetus for the creation of mechanisms for special 
representation. 
The Case for Special Representation
The defining question at this point is whether it is better to encourage political integration of minorities or 
introduce special provisions to enhance minority participation.34 Although, history challenges whether 
integration alone provides sufficient representation for minority groups, this paper makes no argument 
against the validity of using political integration as a means of ensuring representation of marginalized 
groups. In fact, if well constructed, mechanisms for special representation will possess qualities of 
integration and may ultimately be harnessed towards this end. That said, it is the intent of this inquiry to 
limit the scope to an examination of the mechanisms used to provide special representation and their impact 
on minority representation. 
28
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6Shortcomings in representational democracy bring into question whether certain characteristics need to be 
altered to better reflect and meet the needs of society, and especially its associated cleavages. The classic 
tyranny of the majority argument posits that traditional representation bodies fail to effectively represent 
and protect the needs of minority groups. Because minority interests generally differ from those of the 
majority, the majority typically marginalizes groups that do not mirror the mainstream. For example, 
politicians “personal ‘ideology’ is a key determinant of observed policy outcomes”,35 if each politician 
hails from the same class or religion. Based on this theory, little may distinguish one politician’s views 
from another.  Similarly, significant differences observed between the policies favored by male and female 
legislative representatives also contributes to the value of diversity in the legislature. 36  Simply stated, if a 
lack of diversity exists on the legislative level, the opportunity for various marginalized groups to shape 
governmental structure and policies becomes insufficient at best.  
No universally prescribed democratic mechanism, or precise formula exists to ensure that all voices, 
regardless of where they are echoing from are heard. As various international principals demonstrate, 
minority protection and the right to self-determination are fundamental concepts upon which inclusive 
societies ought to be built. Though notions of representation may be inferred from international 
instruments, they are not enough. Even if a strict and well-defined democratic ideal for ensuring the 
protection of minorities existed, without culturally sensitive sub-iterations, it would in all likelihood prove 
insufficient in any number of local scenarios. 
Special procedures are necessary to ensure disenfranchised persons are able to exert their right to self-
determination through the legislature. Ghai notes that by allowing minorities a voice of their own 
establishes the basis of deliberative democracy and also provides an avenue through which these groups 
may seek redress.37 Special representation is not intended to place minorities upon a pedestal, but rather, to 
place them on equal footing with individuals belonging to the majority. Indeed, these special mechanisms 
are premised on their own phase out: once minority representation is successfully attained, the need for 
special mechanisms is rendered redundant. The primary goal of special representation is to help 
marginalized groups achieve recognizably fair political standing, like that of the majority. It follows that 
providing specialized mechanisms to contour the representational equation to the actual mold of society 
supports the underlying objectives of representational democracy.
“I cannot see why the feeling and interests which arrange mankind according to 
localities, should be the only ones thought worthy of being represented.”38
Marginalized groups and society at large are being harmed due to lack of representation. A society’s 
“internal strife is connected to the quality of democracy–– specifically the failure of integrating 
minorities.”39 Conflict in many African nations has evolved for want of conflict prevention strategies which 
in turn give rise to social tension and violence. In fact, an estimated five million people have died in civil 
wars in Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda over the past decade due to the exclusion of marginalized groups.40
There is a widely recognized link between conflicts and violation of minority rights. The African Union has 
observed that “peace, justice, stability and democracy call for the protection of the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of all our people including the national minorities and the creation of 
35
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7conditions conducive to the promotion of this identity.”41 A recent UN report on peace operations asserts 
that in many cases of internal conflict, poverty is coupled with ethnic and religious cleavages leaving 
minority rights insufficiently respected and the institutions of government insufficiently inclusive. The 
report concludes that “every group needs to become convinced that the State belongs to all people”.42
Still many groups are left unconvinced. For example in Kenya alone, Muslim communities complain of 
being concentrated in the slums of urban centers, segregated and subject to discrimination.43 Two Ogeik 
politicians were killed and 200 belonging to the Ogeik, a hunter gatherer community in western Kenya, 
were set ablaze.44 Northern Kenyans have claimed to be marginalized, with MPs having no accountability 
to their constituency.45 There are countless examples of similar problems across all of Africa. These cases 
bring attention to the urgent need for and implementation of mechanisms for enhancing representation as a 
means of promoting conflict prevention and peacekeeping. 
Generally, majority leaders who seek to represent the interests of disenfranchised groups promote prejudice 
and stereotyping.46 Minority groups see no role for themselves in the centralized government and 
consequently a vicious downward spiral of disengagement ensues.47 Under such a system, minorities lack 
confidence in existing institutions, doubt their effectiveness and question whether they might lead to further 
exclusion. This trend of harm will likely continue unless corrective and preventive measures are 
implemented. It is vital to change values and norms of society by widening participation of those groups 
who face discrimination.48 By welcoming minority participation, states are typically more stable and 
prosperous.49 Conversely, denying minorities rights (presumably that of meaningful representation) breeds
intolerance and authoritarianism.50 Establishing special legislative representation may be viewed as one 
means of including historically disadvantaged groups in the public discourse. It also promises an integral 
role for disenfranchised groups in the legislature and thereby a potential means of renegotiating 
relationships with other groups while moving closer toward the goals of stability and prosperity.  
The UNDP has stated that its support of minority participation is not intended as a bias. Rather, it views its 
mission as promoting the rights that are owed to marginalized groups that have suffered as a consequence 
of discrimination.51 It has been asserted, that democracy is flawed without special protection of minorities, 
and that the key component for guaranteeing this protection is ensuring participation in governance.52
Special representation ensures a stake in the country’s political system and helps society focus on the needs 
41
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8of historically powerful and disadvantaged groups.53 In addition, the very process of electing 
representatives mobilizes minorities and reinforces their corporate character.54 Qualities of protection, 
inclusion and progress are inherent to well constructed special representation mechanisms and their value 
cannot be understated.
Tools of special representation provide a practical solution where traditional methods for selecting 
legislative representational fail to represent the will of all groups equally in a given society. If well 
designed and executed, special representation mechanisms are supported by a strong foundation of 
international law principals and can be fashioned to suit a nation’s individual history and present needs. 
Such mechanisms could provide a venue for marginalized groups to express themselves, be involved in the 
decision making process, broaden and contribute to more well rounded discussions and policy creation,  
help correct power imbalances, avert violent conflict and societal tensions, eliminate discrimination, 
enhance the intellectual makeup of a nation and ultimately create a more democratic and just society. In a 
ideal world mechanisms for special representation would be unnecessary. The very notion of 
marginalization would be moot and conflict not an issue. But the practical world dictates that special 
mechanisms are necessary to ensure stability and equity.
BOX 1: The All Pervasive Impact of Inadequate Representation: A Story of 
the Ogoni People
For over 500 years the Ogoni have lived in the Niger Delta of Nigeria as a 
fishing and agricultural people. In various forms, the Ogoni have fallen pray to 
social, environmental and economic oppression. The most explicit form of 
marginalization may be traced back to 1958 when Shell Petroleum Development 
Company discovered oil in the Niger Delta. A government decree ordered the 
Ogoni to give their lands over to oil development and in 1978 the Land Use 
Decree vested all land rights in the government.  At no point in these 
developments where Ogoni voices included. Since the discovery of oil in the 
region, the Ogoni’s environment has suffered and violence has ensued. Gas 
flares have caused air pollution and oil spills have been the source of land and 
water contamination to name but few of the damaging results linked to oil 
exploration, development and mismanagement. To be certain, the subsistence 
lifestyle of the Ogoni was also impacted as the crops and fish became spoiled. 
The Ogoni began to complain to the government in 1970 and in 1990 they 
established the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), an 
NGO  tasked with advocating environmental, social and economic justice for 
their people. In 1994, four of MOSOPs leaders were tried and sentenced to death 
and in the 1996 elections MOSOP leaders were prevented from running for 
elections. The Obasanjo government is credited as working towards greater 
democracy and good governance and in recent years has sponsored development 
projects in Ogoniland with the participation of MOSOP. 
Despite “civil” rule in Nigeria, protective laws and regulations, public protests, 
lawsuits, international support and the highly organized MOSOP, little has 
improved for the Ogoni people. Since these forms of public participation have 
failed, the pivotal question becomes whether the Ogoni and their environment 
would benefit from special representation. A missing component, as found in 
2001 by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, was the 
genuine integration of Ogoni representation—the actual inclusion and 
involvement—into the decisions that impact the wellbeing of this minority 
group. Special representation seems a common sense approach that offers to fill 
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9this void and provide an avenue for the Ogoni to determine the fate of the 
environment in which they live.55
The Cons of Special Representation
Notwithstanding the potential for special representation to achieve an equilibrium in societies lacking 
effective minority representation, many obstacles may impede its design. Indeed, even if implementing 
such mechanisms overcome barriers of creation and find their way into existence, success remains 
questionable. Therefore, it is important to raise the persistent critiques to special representation here and 
illuminate their implications for the actualizing of such mechanisms.  
“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests 
each must maintain, as an agent and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to 
guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole.” 56
To be certain, special representation is understood by many as being undemocratic. Traditional (or perhaps 
more correctly) ideal systems of democracy treat all individuals the same. Void of special privileges, 
traditional democracy places all members of society on equal footing. Either through direct representation, 
whereby parliament mirrors the nation as a whole57 or representational democracy in which representatives 
are selected to represent the voices of society, special representation stands to be in stark contrast with the 
principles of democracy. Mechanisms of special representation may adversely affect the quality of 
legislative candidates as seats reserved for “special” legislators would be viewed as less competitive and 
therefore producing inferior candidates. Similarly, the ability of voters to punish candidates who engage in 
wasteful redistribution or corrupt political practices may be reduced.  Marginalized groups may advocate
policies more likely to reflect the preferences of minority groups instead of benefiting the whole of society. 
Representatives may be more willing to curry favor along group identity lines. Special representation may 
also lead to individuals belonging to non-minority groups to disengage from the political process or incite 
conspiracy and possibly rebel.58
The concept of special representation is unmistakably linked to minority rights and minority specific issues. 
This notion of minorities not only lacks the support of most African nations but is actively shunned. 
Cultural diversity in Africa is viewed as a disruptive and potentially volatile force. One central aspect of 
many African states’ efforts in nation-building has been to unabashedly renounce ethnicity and promote 
national unity. In fact, national unity has been postulated so as to create “a mythical nation-state amidst 
multi-ethnic states.”59 During South Africa’s constitutional drafting, Nelson Mandela, spoke out against 
cultural, group and minority rights being a central component in the new constitution; asserting that, “any 
form of racism was a formula for disaster.”60 The African Union was founded upon the vision that unity of 
African nations would "transcend ethnic and national differences."61  In a similar vein, many African 
constitutions seek to promote national unity by requiring political parties to advance national objectives and 
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not be associated with tribes, ethnic groups or religion.62 Arguably, special representation may threaten 
cooperation between different groups in Africa’s pluralistic societies. It may also be understood as 
undermining the goal of unity and the effort to advance national, rather than group specific, interests by 
drawing upon these classifications. 
Another potential pitfall of special representation stems from the risk that separate representation and 
institutions may to lead to ethnic manipulation or extremism.63 Given the history of violent conflict that has 
been politically or ethnically inspired in Africa, awarding particular groups special representation may lead 
to additional tension and conflict. As Decalo has observed, “Politicized ethnic sentiment remains the most 
meaningful force in Africa’s syncretic, marginal, non-nation states, implying that politics in the new 
democracies will constantly reflect this tug-of war with all its deleterious and divisive negative effects.”64 If 
this statement is accurate, then another negative attribute of special representation may be that it is 
ideologically incompatible with the national identity states are striving to establish. Thus at least in Africa, 
special representation could arguably serve to perpetuate cultural, religious, ethnic and other divisions 
which most African nations are striving to eradicate. As Stanley de Smith has noted, communal seats tend 
“to magnify existing communal differences in as much as communities are stirred to fuller self-
consciousness and electoral campaigns are dominated by appeals to communal prejudices and new 
communities discover themselves as further claims to separate representation are lodged.”65
So ingrained is the history of oppression and marginalization in Africa that the claims of historical 
disadvantage may indeed be endless. Political elites have historically exploited ethnic and religious 
differences for political ends, for example in Nigeria, where historically dominant minorities such as the 
Efik or the Ijaw are now marginalized politically.66 Indeed, one might argue that the entire Nigerian 
population may be deemed marginalized? Or perhaps geography might be the guiding criteria in 
determining what group constitutes a genuine minority. Arguing in favor of district-level as opposed to 
provincial-level divisions during the Kenyan constitutional debates, Delegate Ole Osoi declared, “we have 
an animal called a province, which is only a more marginalizing factor of the more marginalized. People 
like the Ogiek will never go to the province, they will just get finished at the district, just like other small 
communities.”67 Delegate Sasura Abdi Tari pointed out that it is: 
Proven historically that women at the district level have been marginalized by 
the women at the provincial levels and in the city. You will find that in Coast 
Province those who are in Mombasa benefit more, in Nairobi Province those 
who are in the city benefit more, in Eastern Province those who are in Embu 
benefit more, the rural women are always forgotten. So [thirty seats reserved for 
women on the basis of provinces in section 106] should go to the district and not 
to the province.68
Other characteristics may operate to define marginalization as well. Large groups, clearly not of minority 
status, have been marginalized through exclusion from power like the Hutu in Rwanda and the Oromo in 
Ethiopia.69 Citizenship requirements have also served to isolate populations. For example, individuals were 
denied of citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. In these 
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states, citizenship has been a prerequisite of public participation thereby excluding people from 
participating in public life or gain access to land.70 The following section will elaborate on this conundrum.
Where can the line rightly be drawn to fairly distinguish those deserving of special representation? How 
can the determining factors be designed to appease even a fraction of society? The potential floodgate 
argument poses a particular problem to instituting special representation mechanisms. In addition, pleas for 
special attention to group specific issues may be insatiable. For example, in South Africa alone, the Griqua 
community sought official recognition of their traditional leaders and protection of their culture; Muslims 
wanted recognition of Muslim polygamous marriages and hereditary rights; Khoisan were desirous of help 
in developing San languages and teaching them in schools; Khoikhoi sought restitution of their land; the 
December One Movement argued for revival of the memories of suffering under slavery; and Indian 
communities sought fuller recognition of Hindi and Gujerati languages.71 As may be inferred from these 
examples, special representation provisions may likely be accompanied by overwhelmingly numerous and 
complex issues that demand fairness in drawing distinctions and establishing remotely effective rules. How 
could a systematic approach be effectively designed and executed given the uniqueness of each 
circumstance?
“The right to participate is meaningless unless a group has the ability and the resources 
to exercise it.”72
Poverty, lack of education and inadequate sanitation are amongst the plethora of issues so many African 
nations confront, and each is seemingly more urgent than special representation. As stated in the 
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, “the right to participate is meaningless unless a group has 
the ability and the resources to exercise it.”73 It is increasingly recognized that minimum levels of education 
and other social and economic facilities are necessary prerequisite to effectively exercise the right to 
participate.74 The question therefore becomes, given the lack of time and resources, is it prudent to focus a 
nation’s efforts on issues of minority legislative representation when other needs, perhaps affecting a more 
substantial aggregate of the population, appear to be higher priorities. A slightly different position, though 
made along similar lines, is advanced by Professor Cheru. Cheru asserts that a nation must at the very least 
address social and economic issues simultaneously with civil and political concerns for solutions to stick.75
Direct correlations have been documented in this regard. In Wilma Rule’s 1970 and 1972 studies, 70% of 
the variance in the number of women in legislatures was explained by the number of female college 
graduates the number of women in the workforce, the length of women’s suffrage and the level of 
unemployment.76 This evidences the importance and influence of other societal factors that may contribute 
to the failure or success of special representation. Moreover, these points challenge the potential 
effectiveness that a form of special representation may provide.
It could also be argued that special representation is not the best way to ensure or secure the rights of 
marginalized people. For instance, mechanisms may be grounded in the executive or judiciary for 
addressing problems of the disenfranchised. Given the role of these institutions it may be argued that they 
would be more appropriate and powerful avenues through which to launch special representation 
mechanisms and achieve more effective results. Furthermore, the particular composition of a given 
minority group may raise additional issues, each presenting its own unique obstacles that challenge 
society’s level of acceptance and society would have its unique and timely responses to each individual 
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group gaining or seeking special representation. To illustrate this complication, if the minority group of 
choice is women, in addition to the aforementioned problems, issues of conservative interpretations of 
religious texts,77 narrow gender rules, unequal laws, male-biased party leadership, discriminatory 
socioeconomic conditions and “women-unfriendly” elections systems would raise additional factors of 
potential disenfranchisement that would require further attention beyond a simple special representation 
mechanism.78
TABLE 1: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SPECIAL REPRESENTATION
Pros Cons
• Enhances representational democracy by 
contributing to a representational system 
that more accurately mirrors society
• Majority interests do not typically 
represent the interests of minority groups
• Boosts diversity in the legislature
• Designed to cater to the needs of different 
societies
• Validates minority concerns and provides 
their representatives with mode of 
expression 
• Incorporates marginalized groups and 
places them on equal footing with the rest 
of society, giving minorities a stake in their 
nation
• Means of conflict prevention through open 
dialogue and negotiating relationships
• Builds confidence and a formal means for 
engaging the disenfranchised
• States that encourage minority 
participation are more stable and 
prosperous
• Provides redress for historical disadvantage
• Removes obstacles of discrimination, 
allowing minorities to become involved ins 
society
• Mobilizes minority group and reinforces 
corporate character
• Special representation is undemocratic, not 
treating all people equally
• Undermines democratic elections
• Perpetuates stereotypes and cultural, 
ethnic, religious and other group 
distinctions
• Adversely affect the quality of candidates 
• Reduces ability of voters to punish 
candidates
• Produces policies that are more reflective 
of groups with special interests than the 
good of the whole
• Representatives may be more willing to 
curry favors along group identity lines
• Non-minority groups may become 
disengaged and create underground 
movements in rebellion
• Runs counter to African nationalism 
• Promotes a form of privilege which may 
lead to further tension and conflict between 
groups
• Leads to ethnic manipulation or extremism
• Claims for special representation may be 
endless
• Requires resources to implement which 
may be better allocated elsewhere
• Not the most effective means to secure the 
rights of marginalized groups
Who Are the Politically Marginalized: The Semantic Dilemma 
As mentioned above, one of the more complex issues of establishing and executing mechanisms for special 
legislative representation involves the difficulty in defining what groups are to be given marginalized status 
and subsequently special representation.  Particularly in light of Africa’s history of ethnically based 
conflict, the concept of giving a group any form of privilege over another is indeed problematic. Most 
groups are not consciously self aware, and ethnicity has only been an issue where situations of political 
polarization exist.79 While marginalization may be seen as a reactionary, dialectical process,80 international 
law does not help in clarifying matters. There is no universally accepted definition for 
minority/marginalized group/disenfranchised person. That said, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
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stated that determining who is a minority or an indigenous person is a “factual question” to be left to states. 
However, the Committee has also claimed that such a determination should be based on an objective test.81
While no clear definition exists, a number of criteria have been attributed to minority/marginalized groups 
and/or their members. The quality of having a “collective” right that may only be asserted with other 
members of the community is an example.82 Victimization is another character associated with
marginalization.83 Historical disadvantage has also been a defining variable. Perhaps most prominently, 
Gurr’s indicators have been used for identifying minority groups. His indicators are high birth rates, high 
mortality rates, poor health facilities, low literacy and skill levels, lack of resources in comparison to other 
groups and marginalization in land ownership84 It has also been asserted that any disempowered group 
regardless of its size may be considered marginalized.85
 BOX 2: “Minority”86 in Africa?
There is no common legal or practical international standard that is used to distinguish 
marginalized groups from the rest of the population. Despite its repeated use across a 
range of national and international instruments, no consensus has been reached 
establishing a universally acceptable notion of minority. Minority Rights Group 
International asserts that regardless of its demographic makeup, a group that is 
disempowered may be classified as a minority. To further illustrate complexity in 
attempting to clarify marginalization on the African continent, several country facts are 
presented here.  In Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, over 250 different ethnic 
groups have been identified. The following are the most populous and politically 
influential: Hausa -Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, 
Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%.87 There are over 24 major African language groups in 
Cameroon.88 In Chad, 200 distinct groups exist that are fragmented into territories. In 
the north and center of the country: Arabs, Gorane (Toubou, Daza, Kreda), Zaghawa, 
Kanembou, Ouaddai, Baguirmi, Hadjerai, Fulbe, Kotoko, Hausa, Boulala, and Maba, 
most of whom are Muslim; in the south: Sara (Ngambaye, Mbaye, Goulaye), 
Moundang, Moussei, Massa, most of whom are Christian or animist; about 1,000 
French citizens also live in Chad.89 In 2003 it was estimated that fighting between the 
Congolese Government and Uganda- and Rwanda-backed Congolese rebels which 
spawned a regional war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998, left 
1.8 million Congolese internally displaced and caused 300,000 Congolese refugees to 
81
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flee to surrounding countries.90 Ethnicity, culture, language, migration, displacement 
and geographic demography—these examples illustrate the myriad ways in which a 
country’s cleavage populations may be divided and subdivided. 
There is no shortage of groups that have entitlement to marginalized status.  Economically impoverished 
blacks in rural parts of South Africa are neglected by the ANC, the ruling party.91 Violent conflicts in 
Angola in 1993 resurfaced due to controversial majoritarian election results that called for a run off 
between two ethnically based political parties, Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA and Jonas Savimbi’s 
UNITA. Savimbi declined run-off elections and appealed to his group’s fear of being dominated by the 
opposing ethnic group,92 creating tensions between the two ethnicities. Political parties in Sudan are 
dividing along religious lines—Sudan’s north is Muslim whereas the south is non-Muslim. This divide led 
to a collapse of dialogue between north and south and to a renewal of conflict in 1995.93 Once powerful-
Colonial and minority white-ruled states like Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
lend negative connotation to the word “minority”,94 though may now lay claim to marginalization.  
Marginalized95 groups may be characterized in terms of gender, ethnicity, culture, or religion. Similary, 
populations may be isolated according to nomads, indigenous, tribal, non-citizen, immigrant, migrant 
worker and displaced person groupings, each of which can be declared worthy of special representation. 
Those who are economically impoverished or even in the upper financial echelon of society may also be 
disenfranchised. Groups that once ruled and fell from power, homosexuals, youth, the elderly, 
educationally underprivileged, physically challenged or the disabled, the list of potential minority groups in 
arguably inexhaustible. However, the challenges of identification can be met with unbiased, equitable and 
standardized rules and objective and historically sensitive judgment. 
Different countries have opted to deal with defining marginalization based on their respective populations. 
Reclassifying groups so that their minority description is neutral in character is a method, perhaps 
unknowingly, used in Botswana. The Botswanan government considers all residents indigenous and 
therefore does not accept a “First People” definition. To avoid problems of ethnic identification, the 
government has used the term “Remote Area Dwellers” (RAD) since 1978 to denote people living in rural 
areas outside of villages. The government has also created a program called the Remote Area Development 
Program to target group based RADs, which are people characterized by: special location (remote areas 
outside villages), sociopolitical status (marginalized), and socioeconomic status (impoverished and subject 
to discrimination). These RADs are estimated to have a population of 60,000-100,000, of which some 
50,000 are San.96
While the Botswana classification system was not established in the legislative context, it provides a 
meaningful example of a neutral language that may be used in the legal context. In Uganda, the constitution 
enumerates women, disabled, youth and the army as groups having marginalized status.97 Namibia’s 
approach identifies marginalized groups as those which are “socially, economically or educationally 
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disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws and practices.”98 Despite the efforts to create neutral language, 
another complication which arises is that defining one group may lead to the marginalization of another. 
For example classifying women as a marginalized group and striving for their equality has been observed 
to marginalize peasants.99 The lesson here provides us with concrete models used to frame a group’s 
marginalized character in a fashion that mitigates the historical problems of ethnicity and culture while 
simultaneously addressing the representational disadvantage.
John Stuart Mill argued for the inclusion of both majority and minority voices in participatory 
government.100 He observed that it would be a great loss to society to not include its diverse talents and 
views in decision making. For example, a parliament with inadequate female representation might fail to 
understand issues significant to women.101 Indeed, a parliament with a higher percentage of women has 
been proven to pass more laws advancing “women-friendly policies,” like legislation that benefits children 
and families.102  Reynolds states that “the degree to which a system successfully includes women can 
indicate a propensity for the system to include other disenfranchised minorities.”103 When applied more 
broadly, this pattern may be made applicable to other marginalized groups. To quote Reynolds, “Absence is 
not merely a sign of disadvantage and disenfranchisement, but the exclusion of [marginalized groups] from 
positions of power also compounds stereotypes and retards the pace of equalization.”104  The unique 
experiences and worldviews of minorities promise to enrich the decision making process and provide 
incentive for ensuring their inclusion in the legislature. 
MECHANISMS FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE
Proportional Representation
“Electoral systems are not mere details but key causal factors in determining 
outcomes…[they do] so directly in that who is elected under one system may not be 
elected under another system.”105
Two Common Electoral Systems
The two most common electoral systems used in democratic elections are the first past the post (FPTP) and 
the proportional representation (PR) systems. The bulk of case studies and opinions reviewed herein point 
to the proportional representation system as the better option for providing a greater opportunity for
marginalized group representation. Electoral systems may be established in a number of ways. Generally, 
the electoral system will be constitutionally mandated or established via legislative act. In Africa, there are 
also electoral systems informally grounded in tradition. Two preconditions for the proper functioning of a 
nation’s legislature include ensuring the right to elect representatives and having an independent electoral 
commission or international elections monitors oversee the process and promote trust where autonomous 
institutions are lacking.106
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States with constitutional FPTP systems include: Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Uganda. States 
with PR systems set out in their respective constitutions include: Angola, Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. Cameroon, Guinea and Seychelles employ a combination of the FPTP and PR 
systems.107 Other states have a different combination system in place or different system altogether. 
Botswana, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (transitional constitution), Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, South Africa, and Tanzania each employ unique constitutional structures. 
Still other African constitutions remain silent with respect to the electoral system. In total, 26 countries 
have constitutions that fail to address the electoral system. In these cases, the nature of the electoral systems 
is left to legislative and regulatory acts.108
“There is a history of distrusting the electoral process. ‘Rather than provide the 
electorate with the opportunity and freedom to choose a government of their choice the 
government imposes itself...’109 The electoral system was used to prevent structural and 
institutional attempts to challenge the primacy of the ruling party government – a factor 
which undermined the democratic condition.”110
The First Past the Post System 
The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural [multi-ethnic] society is to adopt 
the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post…. Where cleavage is a 
problem, one needs a system which will give minorities adequate representation, 
discourage parochialism, and force moderation on the political parties.”111
The case for and against FPTP set out below is based principally on arguments advanced by Reynolds. The 
FPTP system is considered an advantageous electoral structure as it provides a straightforward choice for 
voters. Casting a vote merely requires placing a mark next to a given candidate’s name or reference 
symbol.  A candidate is not required to affiliate with a political party, and as such, this system 
encourages—or at least provides space for—independent candidates. By voting for a specific person, a 
voter is able to identify with a human being and not a party. Reynolds identifies the most prized quality of 
the FPTP system to be that the elected candidate is in a position to serve and represent constituents from a 
specific geographical area and not be restricted by a party’s platform.  It therefore also follows that in 
voting for a person, a voter may hold the winning candidate accountable for his or her political behavior 
and decisions. This outcome stands in sharp distinction to the PR system, where voters cast ballots for a 
political party.  Another advantage of the FPTP is the ease with which it may be administered. Managing 
the voting process and tallying results does not present the same potentially daunting administrative
burdens that are part and parcel of other electoral systems. Furthermore, the outcome of FPTP elections 
typically produces a single party government that is not compelled to haggle with minority coalition 
partners.  Along these lines, FPTP usually excludes extremist parties from holding seats but engenders 
more realistic opposition parties. This system generally produces candidates that strive to appeal to various 
factions of society and are therefore supported and must answer to a broader spectrum of the electorate 
while in office. As may be gleaned from the above, the FPTP system is prized in large part because of its 
support for people as candidates, not only political parties.112
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Despite its enumerated advantages, FPTP is not without its shortcomings. The most problematic aspects of 
the FPTP are linked to the marginalized group representation and therefore are of utmost concern here. 
Inherent to the FPTP is a built-in disincentive for minorities to participate since it is practically a statistical 
impossibility for such a candidate to be elected.  The FPTP system excludes marginalized groups from fair 
representation since the population’s votes are not mirrored by the seats won in the legislature. For 
example, in the 1989 election in Botswana, the Botswana National Front won 27% of the overall votes, but 
only 9% of the seats. Furthermore, parties endorse candidates that will appeal to the largest percentage of 
the electorate, thereby often excluding the participation of potential candidates from marginalized groups. 
Reynolds refers to this as the “most broadly acceptable candidate syndrome.”113 This phenomenon factors 
into explaining the outcome of a 1995 Inter-Parliamentary Union study which found women were half as 
represented in FPTP systems as opposed to PR systems. 
First past the post systems have also been found to encourage ethnic parties or parties to run by appealing 
solely to a specific ethnicity.   The 1994 elections in Malawi evidenced the regional and cultural divide 
bred by colonial powers. When the South voted for the United Democratic Front, the Central region voted 
for the Malawi Congress Party, and the North for the Alliance for Democracy. Each party secured the votes 
of their respective region and culture. However, in Nigeria, the 1982 constitution introduced incentives into 
the FPTP system. These incentives were designed to integrate different communities by moderating the 
political parties and securing minority support through broader appeal.114
Despite potential incentives, by establishing geographic boundaries as the baseline for determining voter 
choice, FPTP defines politics by geography instead of ideology. In effect this buries or wastes the ballots 
cast by marginalized voters, thereby excluding the opportunity for their voice to be translated into any 
meaningful representation. Wasted votes are understood as contributing to “anti-system” extremist 
movements. Coupled with the stagnant nature of the FPTP system and the lack of responsiveness to public 
opinion, wasted votes give rise to a lack of faith in the system among marginalized voters. Psychologically, 
members of these minority groups may fall prey to the frustration of being disenfranchised and turn 
towards more drastic measures to achieve a political voice.  Lastly the act of “gerrymandering”, or 
malapportionment of district boundaries, may also be noted as a disadvantage of the FPTP system.115
The UN’s 2000 Human Development report points out several additional ways a majoritatrian democracy, 
such as one fostered by an FPTP electoral system, impacts and excludes marginalized groups from the 
political representation. For example, governments lacking minority representatives and a system of checks 
and balances may more easily bypass the rule of law and manipulate or violate the rights of those not 
vested. Left unchecked, majoritarian democracies have a history of oppression which has taken the form of 
imposing religious practices on marginalized groups or banning languages and other cultural identifies. 
Additionally, the economic interests of the majority in power have come at the expense of disenfranchised 
groups. Forced relocations from fertile soil or plentiful natural resources have forced some marginalized 
peoples into impoverishment.116
The Proportional Representation System
“Fairness and equity in electoral competition does not evolve naturally… fairness and ‘equality 
has to be designed introduced and regulated’. An electoral system based on PR is the objective of 
one such democratic design.117
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Of the world’s 36 major democracies, 33 use a form of PR.118 In Africa, 13 nations employ a PR system 
and an additional number of states combine PR with other systems.119 There are three main forms of PR. 
The List PR system is the most common among them. Here, each political party presents voters with a list 
of its candidates. The voter selects their party of choice and based on the percentage of votes the party 
secures, a proportional number of seats to the legislature is allocated.120 This system may have the entire 
state as a single constituency, as with Namibia, or multiple constituencies based on geographical 
markers.121 Large constituencies are best for minorities.122 Party slates can be closed, which means that a 
party determines which candidates will be allocated a seat after the election. Alternatively, a party under 
the open list system allows voters to simultaneously chose a party and indicate their preference for 
individual candidates.123 The second form of PR is the mixed member system. It is a PR hybrid that elects 
half the legislature from single seat, “winner take all” districts and the other half through the list system. 
This system is noted for combining geographic and ideological components with PR.124 This form may also 
accomplish the element of proportionality prized in the List PR if the mixed member system compensates 
for any “disproportionality” stemming from “majoritarian district results.”125 The final PR system 
addressed here is the Single Transferable Vote or Preference Voting system. Here a voter may rank 
candidates in order of preference. If a voter’s choice is not elected, then his or her otherwise wasted or 
“excess” vote (which is what such a ballot would be in other electoral forms) will be transferred to 
subsequent preferences until all seats are filled.126
TABLE 2: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPORATIONAL REPRESENTATION
Pro Con
• Power sharing/conflict management 
mechanism used to overcome ethnic 
conflict 
• party wins parliamentary seats in 
proportion to their share of votes 
• Better at promoting minority group 
mobilization and ensuring representation 
• Minimizes risks of violent conflict 
• Produces governments that more closely 
resemble society 
• Notably higher voter turnout- due to voter 
incentive of selecting a winning candidate 
• Encourages opposition voices and fosters 
better debate 
• Diversifies candidate and legislators 
representatives 
• Makes geographical gerrymandering more 
difficult
• Often results in unstable government 
coalitions or political gridlock
• Lack of accountability as no person is 
directly accountable to constituency 
• Perpetuates social and political cleavages 
• Inclusion of marginalized representatives 
on party list is merely symbolic and averts 
meaningful discussion of minority issues 
• Party loyalty usually trumps ability of 
representative to represent constituency 
• May encourage population growth through 
incentive for minority groups to outgrow 
marginalization
• Requires additional support mechanisms to 
be successful
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Proportional representation emerged as a conflict management and power sharing tool to promote political 
stability in disestablished countries.  The PR system was designed to “overcome politically important 
cleavages in divided societies… it was based on the assumption that political parties are formed along the 
lines of these major cleavages.”127 This assumption is well founded when applied to African history as 
many nations that have chosen to employ some form of PR have done so to overcome ethnically inspired 
conflict. In fact, the PR system has been regarded as an important tool for stabilizing several African 
nations. Post-apartheid South Africa used PR in its first all-race election in 1994 and the two leading parties 
– the African National Congress and the National Party ran multiracial lists that communicated inclusion to 
voters.128 In Liberia, PR was used for one election term as a post conflict tool to redistribute power, after 
which the country would revert to an FPTP system. “The rationale underpinning all proportional 
representation (PR) systems is to consciously reduce the disparity between a party's share of the national 
vote and its share of the parliamentary seats.”129
“Majoritarian attempts to cross-cut political ethnic cleavages into irrelevance only 
suppress them and preserves them as latent sources of tension. Proportional mechanisms 
prevent such suppression of ethnic cleavages by proliferating, dispersing and expanding 
the opportunities of their ventilation.” 130
Proportional representation is based on the principle that any group of like-minded voters should win 
legislative seats in proportion to its share of the popular vote.131 In a PR electoral system the percentage of 
votes a party receives is translated into an identical percentage of legislative seats,132 provided the 
percentage of votes meet the predetermined threshold. In other words, if a party wins 20% of the vote, it 
will likewise occupy 20% of the seats in the legislature. The threshold is the minimum amount of votes a 
party is de-facto or legally required to obtain in order for the votes to convert into seats.133 For example, 
there is a 10% threshold in the Seychelles for 23 available PR seats. In South Africa in 1994, no legal 
threshold was in place and the African Christian Democratic Party won two seats out of 400, winning only 
0.45% of the national vote. If no threshold exists or it is very low, smaller parties – representing 
marginalized group interests, have a greater chance at securing their own seats.134
There is strong evidence that electoral systems based on PR are better at ensuring minority 
representation.135 It is further argued that PR also minimizes risks of violent conflict.136  PR systems tend 
127 Christiaan Keulder,  “Women and Proportional Representation: Assessing the Arguments”, Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Opinion No. 3, October 2001, 
http://www.ippr.org.na/Opinion%20Pieces/Opinion3.pdf> (23 July 2004).
128 Robert Richie and Steven Hill, “The Case for Proportional Representation”, Boston Review A Political 
and Literary Forum, February/March 1998, <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR23.1/richie.html> (30 April 
2004).
129 See supra note 121. 
130
 Murithi 1998, citing Frank Cohen, “Proportional Versus Majoritiarain Ethnic Conflict Management in 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, 30/5 1997.
131
 Smaller amount of votes are wasted on losing candidates, see supra note 124; 6.
132 Dr. Fernand de Varennes, “Towards Effective Political Participation and Representation of Minorities”, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 25-28 May 1998 <
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/9bc6715374fa0079c125696d00445b1e?Opendocument> 
(23 July 2004).
133 See supra note 121.
134 Ibid.
135 Ayers et al., “Democracy and Identity Based Conflicts: Problems or Solution?”, in Democratic 
Institutions and Politics in the Contexts of Inequality, Poverty and Conflict: A Conceptual Framework, 
DRAFT Working Paper, November 1, 1999, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/govern/pdfs/demcon.pdf> (4 May 
2004).
136 Ibid.
20
to produce governments that represent the median.137 The PR system is credited with increasing voter 
turnout from between 10 to12% twelve percent when comparing nations using PR to similar nations using 
winner take all or FPTP systems.138 Voter turnout is understood to be higher because the likelihood of a 
voter selecting a winning candidate is increased, therefore providing incentive for voters.139 Ideas are more 
likely to be debated and opposition voices heard, as there is increased opportunity for legislatures to 
entertain more varied perspective with diversified representatives.  Marginalized groups have more 
occasions to negotiate for influence because smaller parties could “swing” between various parties political 
factions.140 The PR system encourages minorities to mobilize themselves to win access to power.141 It is 
interesting to note that majority rule and PR are not mutually exclusive. Richie has explained majority rule 
itself is improved by full minority representation: “by maximizing the number of voters who elect 
candidates, PR increases the chances that a legislative majority has support from a majority of its voters.” 
This translates into the ability to foster a more deliberative legislative process. Additionally, PR makes 
geographical gerrymandering more difficult and there is a smaller amount of votes wasted on losing 
candidates.142
The proportional representation system is not void of shortcomings. Political stability may be threatened by 
failing coalitions or gridlock of parties.  Religious or extremist parties may hold a stable government 
coalition hostage.  Lack of accountability is frequently highlighted as problematic to PR since ideological 
parties rather than district representatives are representing the electorate.143 Proportional representation falls 
short of incentives for “racial moderation” and bridging the gap between different groups. Instead it 
“freezes in and perpetuates the socio-political cleavages”144 by providing the incentive of securing 
representation if a group bands together based on their marginalized character. Multi-ethnic candidate lists 
are arguably nothing more than eye-candy for marginalized or other ethnic groups, giving the “illusion of 
representivity” and “obfuscating a discussion of cultural issues.”145 Gilomee believes the “ideology of 
inclusiveness is usually not much more than vaguely reassuring.”146 Closed party lists also pose a problem 
as they generally lack measures to ensure that representatives are accountable to their constituencies.147
Party loyalty hinders the ability of a representative to genuinely represent their constituency. Rosa Namisia 
, an MP from Nambia, stated that “party loyalties keep women from uniting around the issues of concern to 
women of Namibia who are after all the majority of our population.”148 During discussions amongst 
delegates at the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission one delegate stated another, perhaps more 
curious, argument against PR, that “if going to go by population alone, I think we are endangering the 
principle and the policies of family planning. Because we might as well encourage those who are lagging 
behind… to multiply faster and catch up and avoid being marginalized.”149 It has been asserted that the 
pure PR system alone is only part of the representational puzzle. To be truly effective, PR must be 
combined with a quota system for party lists150 or another mechanism designed to secure effective minority 
representation. 
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Many additional factors contribute to determining the allocation of seats in a PR system. Several examples 
are helpful to highlight the range of variables that may contribute to different constructs of the PR system. 
Factors that differentiate PR systems include: the method used to calculate and convert votes into seats, the 
number of members chosen to represent a district (district magnitudes and the demarcation of boundaries) 
and the complexity of the voting process. To better understand the influence and intricacy of these factors, 
district magnitudes serves as an illuminating example. Large districts achieve the greatest degree of 
proportionality and ensure that small parties are represented in the legislature. However, as districts grow 
larger the connection between an elected member and their constituency becomes attenuated as there are 
simply more constituents for each member to represent. In societies where local issues are important to the 
party’s politics, which is typically the case with marginalized groups, this may have negative 
consequences.151
Examples of Proportional Representation in Africa 
Proportional representation systems make up a third of all electoral systems in Africa. As addressed above, 
a number of states use a pure PR system as mandated by their respective constitutions or legislative 
framework, while others combine PR and FPTP systems.  Still other states credit their electoral structure to 
tradition, or other “informal” origins. Experimentation with PR is not uncommon. Some countries have 
opted to implement the PR system for a term to establish a power-sharing framework and then shift to 
another electoral system. Many African states have chosen to use the PR system for the aforementioned 
reasons and it is widely believed to be a superior system for ensuring legislative representation of 
disenfranchised groups. This section spotlights several cases of African electoral systems.
Sudan
In Sudan, PR was chosen in part for its appeal as a transitional mechanism to ease into a power sharing 
arrangement and offer a more inclusive system for marginalized groups. Article 67 of the Sudanese 
Constitution establishes that 75% of the National Assembly shall be directly elected from geographical 
constituencies that reflect the proportional representation of the country’s population. The remaining 25% 
of members are elected through special elections or indirect elections from “women, and the scientific and 
professional communities, in either states or nationally, as determined by law.” In the event that national 
security impedes the process of special elections, the constitution provides that the President of the 
Republic may appoint such persons as would normally hold the seats of the constituency until elections 
may be held.152 Of Sudan’s 360 members in its National Assembly, 35 or 9.7% are filled by women.153
BOX 3: Why the Increase of Women Represented in Parliament?
Reynolds’1999 study of women in legislatures found that the position of women 
in society and history of participation will impact women’s representation in the 
legislature. Reynolds found that the number of parliamentary parties and the 
existence of a quota for women will increase the number of women represented 
in the legislature. Accordingly, legislatures with few strong parties were found 
to have more women elected to the legislature while legislatures with many 
parties had a lesser amount of elected women, but a higher amount of nominated 
women.154 List PR with high district magnitudes and low thresholds are 
understood as being most advantageous to women.  The ANC party in South 
Africa and the Frelimo party in Mozambique operating in a closed list system 
placed an admirable percentage of women candidates in top slots so as to secure 
a fair number of female legislators. A Mozambican attributed the higher than 
average number of female representatives in parliament to women’s 
involvement in the national revolution. In a similar manner, women played an 
important role in overseeing military activities in Uganda, and this fact is often 
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cited as a reason underlying their heightened parliamentary representation in that 
country.155
South Africa
The proportional representation system is said to have been introduced in South Africa to allow for smaller 
political party representation in parliament. Its nascent Constitution boasts some of the most progressive 
provisions in the world, it enumerates no less than 21 categories in its non-discrimination clause.156
Currently, South Africa uses the proportional representation model for electing MPs to its National 
Assembly and its upper house, the National Council of Provinces. The country’s PR system maintains a 
very low threshold, thereby permitting smaller parties to secure representation.157 Two factors are attributed 
to determining voter choices in South Africa: First, ethnic group, as is the case for the predominately Zulu 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The second, the fierce loyalty that many South Africans still hold towards the 
ANC. This loyalty is based on the party’s leadership role during the struggle to remove the apartheid 
regime from power. In support of the democratic foundation on which PR itself is based, South Africa also 
has created a host of institutions and participatory bodies in an effort to ensure that every possible faction 
of society is heard by government. A noteworthy policy at the municipal level is that mechanisms 
facilitating community participation cater to the special needs of illiterate, disabled, women and other 
disadvantaged groups. However, legislators often lack adequate training to effectively relate and explain 
government processes to their constituents. As one local has noted, “legislatures are truly just there for 
form, and not substance.” 158
“Favorable societal conditions will not substitute for unfavorable electoral systems for 
women to reach their optimal representation in parliament and local legislatures. But 
unfavorable contextual conditions—including cultural biases and discriminatory 
practices can be overcome to a great extent by a[n] alternate electoral system. 159
Despite the noble concept behind the proportional representation system, genuine representation in a PR 
system—that would ideally provide for the articulation of dynamic perspectives, vivacious debates and 
momentum on issues germane to marginalized peoples—is constrained by issues such as ethnicity, gender, 
economic status and demographic identity.160As Suzanne Vos, an IFP MP has stated, women MPs are 
“hostage to hierarchical and male-dominated parties where the gender ticket is not the route to party 
power.”161 In a similar manner, a female ANC MP has observed that women “are there to represent women 
but at the same time one has to be careful because at the next election you could be pushed off the list. You 
have to take account of party loyalties.”162
Patterns have also been associated with rural voters whereby this electorate votes according to the party 
endorsed by their traditional leader.163 Indeed, traditional leaders possess much power, particularly in the 
most impoverished and rural areas. In Eastern Cape, Kwazul-Natal, Limpop and Mpumalanga provinces, 
traditional leaders essentially dictate politics. The IFP is associated with traditional leadership and 
tribalism. Its constituents tend to be ethnically based. Historically, rural chiefs from Kwazulu-Natal served 
as the principal impetus for establishing the IFP. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the IFP, is considered 
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among the most forceful politicians advocating traditional leadership.164 It may be gleaned from these cases 
that while the PR system offers many ideological benefits, in practice there is room for improving its 
operation.
Liberia
The Republic of Liberia, founded by freed slaves from the United States in 1820, declared its independence 
in 1847. It was a peaceful nation until 1980 when the leader of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group, Master 
Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, seized power by killing President William R. Tolbert and other members of his 
government. Shortly thereafter, Doe and his supporters brought ethnicity to the forefront. Those of Krahn 
ethnicity took control of the military and government and in 1984 banned political parties.  The year 1989 
marked the beginning of a seven-year civil war which took the lives of 200,000 and displaced 
approximately one million others.165 International institutions attempted to broker over a dozen peace 
agreements and nearly 20 cease fire arrangements yet the conflict persisted. The repeated demise of the 
peace process and the desperate economic and political situation further intensified internal divisions 
between ethnic groups.166 Only the elections of 1997 signaled an end to the civil war. 
The proportional representation system was introduced in Liberia to arrange for power sharing between the 
competing factions, thereby doing away with the former electoral system.167  Political analysts asserted that 
proportional representation could reach constituencies that were made inaccessible during the civil war.168
Charles Taylor’s political party, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) won the 1997 elections by a 
75% majority. The NPFL won 70 of the 90 legislative seats.169 Despite the victory many claimed that the 
NPFL only won because Liberians feared the outbreak of another war should Taylor have lost.170 While the 
Constitution provided for the right to free and fair elections, and a considerable peacekeeping force was in 
place during the electoral process, voters remained intimidated by the military forces.171
Still the benefits of PR and its function as a structure supporting political transition are not to be 
understated.  Granted that the impact of a PR system in a post conflict society is often tempered by 
corruption, intolerance and domineering leaders, it is nonetheless a practical solution for renegotiating 
power distribution.  In this capacity, PR is an important tool for marginalized groups as through it they may 
capitalize on representation opportunities. To be sure, meaningful representation, inclusion and dialogue 
appear to be a promising formula for conflict prevention. In this way PR offers to aid marginalized groups 
and society as a whole by creating institutions in which each citizen has a stake. 
Demarcation 
A 2003 study analyzed the relationship between ethnic characteristics (specifically race and language) and 
a group’s identification with a political party. It concluded that in eight of the 12 countries surveyed, 
ethnicity played a “significant” role in determining political party support. In the most ethnically 
fractionalized societies, including Nigeria and South Africa the correlation between ethnicity and party 
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support was found to be the strongest.172 This finding supports Horowitz’s theory that ethnicity has a direct 
impact on electoral behavior in ethnically diverse societies. Horowitz identifies the psychological 
connection of citizens to parties as stemming from feelings of loyalty to a particular party and the symbolic 
value of a vote selection being equated to group identity.173 Current geographic boundaries in Africa are 
intimately linked to the issue of ethnicity and the resulting patterns of ethnically divided constituencies are 
not an accidental wonder. Rather this phenomenon is in part a result of careful and intentional planning by 
the British, who sought to harness ethnic tensions as a means of maintaining control over their colonies. It 
is therefore not surprising that ethno-political affiliations did not rapidly deteriorate.
Constituencies in Africa remain ethnically demarcated. Although the colonial period formally drew 
boundaries according to political convention ethnic lines, most of these boundaries remain in effect in the 
current post-independence era. The persistence of ethnic boundaries may in part be attributed to the strong 
reliance of political parties on ethnically based constituencies. Accordingly, established political parties 
typically oppose efforts to reorganize electoral districts for fear of compromising their political support. 
Ethnic constituencies represent the mainstay of a reliable voter base that may be encouraged by tribal 
leadership and manipulated by political promises of resource allocation and political favor.174 This section 
explores the patters in several states to better understand how electoral districts came to be demarcated. It 
also pulls upon the example of the San people to understand the effects of delimitation upon a marginalized 
group and the different ways of addressing geographic marginalization across borders. It should be noted 
that while the history of colonization has left a common mark on many African nations concerning the 
issue of boundary demarcation, little reliable information is currently accessible on the current 
demographic composition of electoral districts.175
Nigeria
In the 1940s, colonial powers divided Nigeria into three regions, based on the three predominant ethnic 
groups in the north, southeast and southwest.176 These boundaries became official in 1954 and remained 
until independence in 1960.177 With the establishment of these regions, the interests of minority ethnic 
groups became marginalized. Dominant ethnic groups became “regionalist” and minority groups sought 
protection from neighboring regions under the wings of the hegemonic groups. The basis for the current 
violence in Nigeria is intimately connected to the division of these three groups: the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers 
State Movement, the Midwest State Movement and the Niger Delta Congress. In 1963, a fourth region was 
created for ethnic minorities in the western part of the country. Five years later, an attempt to secede by the 
eastern region inspired the military government to divide Nigeria into 12 states.178 Continuing demands for 
greater autonomy increased over time and were met with additional boundary demarcations. Nigeria 
jumped from 19 states in1976 to 36 states in 1996. To be certain, this pattern of redistricting facilitated the 
increased concentration of power in the federal military government and the mounting tensions between 
ethnic groups.  As the northern states maintained larger populations, and representation was linked to 
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population size, the opportunities for minorities to elect their choice representatives to regional assemblies 
became nonexistent.179
In 1993, democrats resurrected a “six-zonal blueprint” designed by the British during their colonial rule.180
Though unofficial, these zones have become increasingly realized and acknowledged as distinct political 
entities.181 The southeast, southwest and northwest are home to culturally, linguistically and politically 
similar groups while the other three zones are ethnically diverse. The Igbo are the dominant ethnic group in 
the southeast while the Yoruba dominate the southwest; both groups have separatist aspirations. In the 
northwest, the Hausa-speaking emirates182 are the majority population with a leadership interested in
“transregional aims” grounded in “pre-colonial history and religious culture.”183 The populations in the 
northeast and north-central zones share a common history with the Hausa people of the northwest and also 
similar goals of living in accordance with Sharia, or Islamic law. These demands have further polarized 
ethnic constituencies, particularly between the northern and southern states. The northeast is comprised of 
myriad ethnicities, many of which trace their lineage to the emirates or identify with either the traditional 
leadership of Sokoto Caliphate or the Muslim-like Kanuri kingdom. The majority of the region is Muslim, 
however there is a small non-Muslim population in the southernmost part of the zone that aspires to 
autonomy. The north-central zone is the most culturally diverse, boasting the largest number of ethnicities 
of all the zones. Though there is no overarching political identity in this area, it is united by the will to 
separate from the Muslim emirates. Both it and the southerly zone are “defensive rather than autonomist”. 
Like the north-central zone, the southern zone also has various ethnic groups and includes the Niger Delta, 
from where 90% of the country’s exports are derived.184
The dynamic of Nigeria’s constituencies and their historical components are too complex to summarize in 
this brief space. It has been noted that the problems within Nigeria may not be simply reduced to Muslim-
Christian tensions, but are much more multifaceted. Though perhaps the inability of repeated successions 
of government to adequately tackle minority issues has led to violence, human rights abuses and 
environmental degradation, the lack of institutional structure and support for marginalized groups has 
further entrenched the colonial legacy of exclusion. Encouragingly, positive steps have recently been 
observed. The 2003 election resulted in over 30 political parties fielding candidates, whereas only two were 
permitted in 1999. Though more than 100 people were killed in conflicts related to the election, it produced 
the first power transfer from one civilian administration to another without military intervention since 
independence.185
Kenya
Kenya’s electoral districts or constituencies vary in number of voters from 4,000 to over 300,000. Kenyan 
districts are divided into ecological zones. As a result, residents in sparsely populated, arid areas are over 
represented while densely populated urban areas are underrepresented.186 This representation system has 
existed since the early 1960s and has not been met with the introduction of more equitable electoral 
boundary demarcation. Section 42(3) of the Kenyan Constitution leaves the delimitation of electoral 
districts largely to the discretion of the Electoral Commission. While this section establishes the standard 
that constituencies be equal in number of inhabitants, it gives the Electoral Commission broad authority to 
abandon this standard and devise a scheme which it determines suitable in light of articulated criteria in this 
section.187 One notable result has been the continuation of a single ethnic group dominating a district.188
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This system was not the subject of much scrutiny until 1992, when Kenya transitioned to a multiparty 
political system and political opposition leaders grew wary of the demarcation of existing constituencies.189
Because political parties in Kenya are generally associated with a particular ethnic group or tribe which has 
in turn been enveloped into its own constituency, Barkan reasons that the current system better represents 
regions that support the ruling party and inadequately represents regions that support opposition parties.190
Barkan suggests that a more equitable design of constituencies would emphasize equal populations per 
district and minimize differences in compactness. Given the current electoral districts, the outcome of 
parliamentary elections are attributed to “realignment and shifting alliances” between parties rather than to 
fair representation.191
Tanzania
During the colonial era, the British ruled Tanzania and imposed a system of local government based on 
chiefdoms drawn strictly in relation to ethnic lines. After gaining its independence in 1961, Tanzania 
quickly abolished the chiefdom system. From this point the government determined that boundaries would 
be demarcated according to population. Despite the shift in approach to delimiting districts, ethnic divisions 
did not disappear. As populations in a district would increase, formerly ethnic based constituencies would 
be divided into two or more new constituencies, thereby creating additional constituencies though still 
largely retaining the same ethnicity. Currently, districts are randomly redrawn. The most recent 
demarcation took place in 1995, and these districts remain subdivisions of old constituencies – divided now 
by population, but having the same ethnic make up as previous chiefdoms.192
The only Tanzanian districts exhibiting a moderately diverse ethnic makeup exists in the major urban areas. 
Approximately 15% of the country’s overall population lives in urban environments, while the other 85% 
live in agricultural communities almost entirely characterized by a particular ethnic group.193 At present, 
Tanzania is divided into 21 regions and 111 districts.194 A Tanzanian Embassy official in Washington, D.C. 
stated that many of the pastoralist tribes have their own representatives who air concerns on behalf of their 
constituency.195 The current prime minister and a cabinet minister are from the Barabigs pastoralist group, 
an extremely marginalized group, having no representation in parliament. The Maasai are another 
marginalized group, and though they have significant representation in parliament it is not considered 
particularly meaningful.196 The crux of the representational issues in Tanzania is that the parliament has 
never been a locus of power and rests on the margins of the national power structure. Lissu, a Tanzanian 
attorney, stated that, “no one takes the parliament seriously.”197  The parliament has no administrative 
support, and no representative has assistance in information gathering. As a result, legislators attend 
debates unprepared. In the anticipated 2005, election the country will shift to a proportional representation 
system, which is hoped to encourage dialogue with opposition voices and offer more credibility to the 
parliamentary structure.198 Currently only five of the sixteen political parties are hold seats.199
Niger
In 1991, Niger transitioned to a multi-party system. Legislation provided that the multi-party system was to 
be “non-regionalist” in character, though it allowed political parties to carry out “regional or sub-regional 
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integration projects that would not undermine national interests.”200 The following year, the government 
allocated eight of the 83 National Assembly seats to special electoral constituencies. These special 
constituencies were designed to compensate historically disadvantaged minority groups marginalized by 
the “colonial recognition of traditional authorities.”201 This law further provided that the eight seats would 
go to the smallest minorities, principally the Arab, Toubou and Gourmantche communities, who currently 
comprise 1.2% of Niger’s population. 202 In essence, ethnic communities not labeled as “traditional” or 
included in the traditional authority scheme for representation were identified by their ethnicity and given a 
special seat in parliament.203
In 1993, in an effort to move away from colonial era ethnic districting, Niger embarked on an ambitious 
attempt to reform electoral boundaries. Several additional factors influenced the State’s effort at geographic 
redistricting. First, public demand for “democratization and liberalization” of political life. Second, 
international financial institutions required decentralization. And finally, the 1995 peace accords with the 
Tuareg rebels both required the Nigerien government to create “regional territorial collectives” and the 
overall disengagement and “systematic mobilization of local stakeholders”.  Between 1994 and 1995 Niger 
drew new boundaries dividing the country into communes, arrondissements (similar to the municipal 
subdivision used in France), departments and regions. Though this redivision established approximately 
1,000 entities over four levels, it never made it past the idea stage. Instead, in 1998 boundary reform aimed 
to shape Niger into a system resembling decentralization. 
The current electoral demarcation in Niger is highly complex. Haphazard divisions are modeled on pre-
colonial historical provinces and have resulted in the creation of regional seats assigned to all provincial 
centers and official sultanates. Historical entities such as the Maouri lands and Gobir and Katsina regained 
autonomy. The reemergence of these historical districts confused the status of modern towns such as 
Dakoro, Filingué and Dosso and reduced their jurisdiction.  Consequently, these towns sought to secure 
better existing constituencies.  As it stands, different regions maintain various levels of political autonomy 
and tensions remain linked to ethnic division.
Mauritius
The Dutch settled Mauritius in 1598, and after it passed through the hands of the French, the British 
captured the island in 1810.204 Colonization created ethnically based constituencies, though in contrast to 
other nations, additional components factored into the “spatial distribution” of groups, thus making 
ethnicity but one component in a more complex political identity.  Spatial distribution in Mauritius has 
been attributed to a myriad of interests including culture, language, religion, labor and occupational 
structure. The resulting “ethnopolitical demography”, brought out both inter and intra-group cleavages. The 
rise of ethnicity as a main source of marginalization may be traced to the importation of slaves from East 
African and indentured labor from India to work on sugar plantations. While the Legislative Council 
created a form of limited political representation in 1886 that eventually expanded beyond the Franco-
Mauritian elite communities to include Creoles, Hindis and Muslims, leadership positions remained 
restricted. Mozaffar points out that political mobilization was not only grounded in ethnicity but also 
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prompted by trade unions and class-based party politics. Mozaffar adds that the “cultural and demographic 
differences corresponded with differences in the distribution of economic and political resources.”205
The 1947 Constitution created a 34-member Legislative Council, 19 members were elected, 12 nominated 
and three appointed official members.  This composition sought to satisfy the Indo-Mauritian demand for 
majority rule and the Franco-Mauritian demand for minority protection. In the 1948 elections, Indo-
Mauritians won all the seats in the three-member rural constituencies and all but one of the representatives 
came from the professional middle class. The Creole and Muslims groups received many votes in the urban 
constituencies, though due to their geographic dispersion no Muslim was elected. Eventually, most political 
parties organized along ethnic lines and by the 1959 elections, parties began forming coalitions in 
preparation for the shift in system from five to forty single member constituencies. Notably, communal 
interests took priority over class interests for value of strategic coordination. By 1967, political parties 
became multiethnic and began appealing to diverse constituencies on the basis of common interest. For 
example, the Muslim constituency was too small and spread out so the Comité d’Action Muselman (CAM) 
aligned with the Indo-Mauritian Mauritius Labor Party (MLP) while other groups became allies in anti-
Hindu campaigns. 
Mauritius achieved independence in 1968.206 Its Mauritian territory is comprised of the island of Mauritius 
and the island of Rodrigues. Today, Mauritius is divided into 20 constituencies, each with three seats; 
Rodrigues serves as the 21st constituency and has two seats.  The National Assembly has 70 members, with 
62 elected seats and the remaining eight allocated to the "best losers”.207 The Electoral Supervisory 
Commission nominates the eight representatives—or best losers—from among the defeated candidates that 
received the most votes in an effort to establish inter-ethnic and inter-party balance in parliament.208
Mauritius is the only African country aside from Botswana that has maintained an uninterrupted democracy 
since independence.209
The San People
The San have a population of about 90,000 and live primarily in or near the Kalahari Desert in Namibia and 
Botswana. San are also found in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe210 and South Africa211and their archeological 
history traces back some 20-30,000 years.212 The San make up 3% of the total populations in both Namibia 
and Botswana.213 San people are often characterized as sharing a hunter-gatherer ancestry, and speaking 
Khoisan languages, and living in small 25-30 person kinship groups.214  Currently, they are subject to 
discrimination and regarded as second class citizens in their home countries.215 According to Suzman, San 
have been targeted by special statutes and in every country they have lived in they are treated as 
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vagrants.216 Hitchcock observes that the development of Community Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM) is a promising development for the San as it allows them to exert control over their lands and 
resources.217 Since 1997, 28 CBNRM schemes have been created in Botswana and 14 in Namibia. In 
addition, many San are working in the Workgroup for Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa,218 an 
organization created by San people to represent them at all levels of society.219
The San in Botswana
Currently, there are three San representatives in the district council of Ghanzi, Botswana, where 42% of the 
population are San. There is one female representative in the House of Chiefs from the Chobe district, 
though she is not believed to be voting on behalf of San interests.220 Hitchcock argues that the San of 
Botswana are involved in a great struggle. As marginalized groups the San are “co-opted and become little 
republics,” though they are actively trying to become more engaged in the political process, particularly in 
Botswana, where efforts are made to secure a special representative in parliament.221 This undertaking is 
hampered by the fact that the government of Botswana does not recognize the San as a distinct people. 
Representation of the San is partly accomplished through the dominant Tswana tribal system. As 
mentioned above, Botswana identifies all residents as indigenous people. Instead of identifying ethnic 
groups for special assistance, the government created the Remote Areas Development Program to provide 
aid to a less controversial “designed” group. This necessarily impedes the creation of special representation 
and consequently, any chance for the promulgation of San rights and views in parliament. Unfortunately, 
San representatives who have become district counselors typically fail to advance the interests of their 
constituency or effectively represent San people, as they have been noted to merely represent their own self 
interests.222
The San in Angola and South Africa
Discussing constituencies as they relate to the San is challenging, insofar as they live in small scattered 
groups and have historically been dominated by other ethnicities. In Angola for example, San communities 
live on communal lands managed the Bantu sobas223 and local government. In these areas, San have no 
jurisdiction over their lands nor any control over their resources. San leaders are precluded from 
representing themselves at local soba council meetings. In 2003, Senhor Piriquito Kambili of Hombo, 
Kipungu Municipio, Huila Province and Senhor Arudingo of Cafima, Kwanyama Municipio, Cunene 
Province, two San leaders were recognized as leaders by the local government and soba councils and 
currently act as representatives, or perhaps more correctly liaisons, between government agencies and the 
San people.224 In northwest and northwest South Africa, land bases have been allocated to the ++Khomani, 
!Xun and Khwe, three small San communities, for further development. It is unclear how these 
constituencies are represented.225
The San of Namibia
Namibian constituencies were created on the principle of separate development.226 The South West African 
Administration (SWAA) allocated prime farming land in central Namibia to white farmers and marginal 
areas or “native reserves” to the Herero and Nama peoples. The San people were not even considered for 
these plots, as they were deemed an insufficiently developed group. This process was implemented by the 
216 Ibid, quoting James Suzman, “Regional Assessment of the Status of the San in Southern Africa” 2001. 
217
 Lee 2002.
218 Ibid.
219
 Geingos 2002. 
220
 Professor Robert Hitchcock, University of Nebraska, telephone interview 28 April 2004.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223
 Geingos 2002. 
224
 Benedito Quessongo, Daniel Gaspar, Americo Kwononoka and Richard Pakleppa, “Where the First are 
the Last: San Communities fighting for Survival in Southern Angola”, Working Group of Indigenous 
Minorities in Southern Africa, 2003, < http://www.wimsareg.org/angolframeset.htm> 22 July 2004).
225
 Geingos 2002. 
226
 Suzman, James, “Minorities in Independent Namibia”, Minority Rights Group International Publication, 
2002; 8.
30
Native Reserves Commission of 1921 who carried out the SWAPO development scheme, allocating 
separate reserves for various ethnicities and controlled their movement within the colony. The Odendall 
Plan formally enshrined this practice during the 1960s and 70s.227 Until today, Nambian townships remain 
divided into separate “homelands” based on ethnic groups such as the Herero, Damara, Owambo and 
others.228
The dominant party is the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), traditionally supported by 
the largest ethnic group in the country, the Owambo, who comprise approximately 50% of society.229 The 
rest of Namibia consists of more than seven minority groups none of which make up more than 10% of the 
general population.230 SWAPO has been known to address minority concerns, and as a result has harnessed 
the support of many members of minority constituencies.231 SWAPO’s policies culminated in the 
Proclamation AG8 of 1980, which empowered seven major ethnic groups—the Basters, Damara/Nama, 
Herero, Himba, Kavango and Owambo—to elect government representatives from their respective ethnic 
constituencies.232  This policy effectively excluded other more marginalized groups. 
Several political decisions made with respect to the San people in Namibia underscore the need for San 
interests to be made an equal and integrated part of the decision making process. The 2001 Traditional 
Authorities Act (TAA) establishes a role for traditional leaders within the overall state governance scheme. 
The traditional communities enumerated in the TAA are afforded recognition and a voice although 
parliamentary influence remains unequal.233 To be considered a “traditional community” the TAA requires 
that an ethnic group must “inhabit a common communal area.” Because Namibia never granted the San 
land rights in the native reserves, according to the TAA they are deemed a landless people and therefore 
denied the opportunity to secure representation by their traditional leaders.234 In 2002, none of the 
traditional authorities from the traditional San communities were listed as such. However, more recently 
example, three of the six San groups in Namibia were recognized by the Namibian government as 
traditional communities. The !Kung of the Tsumkwe District West, the Ju|’hoan of the Tsumkwe District 
East (Nyae Nyae) and the Naro of the Ghanzi District are the recognized communities though 
representation in the parliament still does not exist. In 2001, the Namibian government denied the Khwe of 
West Caprivi and the !Xõó of Omaheke South and the Ju|’hoan of Omaheke North official recognition.235
Needless to say, without the requisite recognition and inclusion in existing mechanisms of governance, the 
San remain inadequately represented in Namibia. While one member of the National Assembly is San, no 
regional or local council seat is occupied by a San person.236 Subsequently, the San do not benefit from 
laws like the Communal Lands Bill which grants community leaders the right to allocate land and 
“reaffirms land as a constituent of their heritage and identity.”237 In light of these realities, on the ground it 
would appear that article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, that declares “delineation of 
the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities… shall be geographical only…”238 is arguable.
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“The argument that special representation is reserved for groups (of a special kind) 
carries with it the proverbial Pandora’s box.”239
Another method for securing special representation for marginalized groups in parliament is to guarantee 
them a minimal number of seats in the legislature. Essentially, this practice equates to affirmative action or 
positive discrimination. Parliamentary seats may be set aside for enumerated groups using several different 
mechanisms.  Two of the more common mechanisms are reserved seating and quotas. At least 17 countries 
in Africa use a form of the quota system240 and a minimum of five countries reserve seats.241
Geographical quotas are common to nearly all political systems in Africa.242 They are employed to ensure 
that densely populated areas will have a predetermined minimum number of representatives, though no 
uniform international application exists, when used in the parliamentary context, a quota is understood as a 
mechanism specifying a certain number or percentage of members of a body, either in a candidate list or a 
parliamentary assembly. Essentially, a quota functions as “a qualitative jump into a policy of exact goals 
and means.”243 The quota system shifts the burden from individuals belonging to marginalized group to 
those who control the legal instrument, government, or committee charged with developing or preserving 
the electoral process. The core idea behind this system is to recruit marginalized peoples into political 
positions and to ensure that they are not isolated in political life.244 Quota systems aim to create a “critical 
minority” and strive to establish form of a balance at the national level of government. Quotas may be 
applied to a pool of potential candidates, nominated candidates or elected candidates. 245 Ideally, the use of 
a quota serves as a stopgap measure to be removed once the obstacles impeding fair representation is 
remedied. It should be noted that the use of quotas are gaining international support.246
“The use of quotas is increasingly influenced by international recommendations and 
from cross-country inspiration. However there is no international concept of quotas as 
they are met with very different contexts in individual countries.”247
The effectiveness of a quota system is contingent on many variables including the country context, method 
by which the quota is established and terms of implementation. There are three principal types of quota 
systems: Constitutional Quotas, Election Law Quotas or Regulation for National Parliament and Political 
Party Quotas for Electoral Candidates. Constitutional Quotas essentially enshrine the quota provisions 
within framework of the constitution. This practice is currently used in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Electoral 
Law Quotas or Regulation for National Parliament encode the quota provision either in national legislation 
or a regulatory framework, as is the case in Sudan.248 Finally, the National Parliament and Political Party 
Quotas represents an internal structure which takes one of two forms. The given political party may be 
mandated to nominate a prescribed number of candidates249 from a given denomination, or the party may 
establishe a fixed percentage of candidates from certain denominations250 by its own will and design. The 
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African National Congress in South Africa and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in Mozambique 
use the Political Party Quota.251
The 1980s and 1990s saw the women’s movement galvanize itself around securing positions of political 
influence in decision making. In 1995, The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing called for a 
30% floor of women representatives in national governments. Of the elections held in 23 sub-Saharan 
Africa countries from 2000-2002, 14 of them recognized an increase in women parliamentarians.252
Notably, Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania and Uganda have made 
major political strides in this regard.253 That said, during the same election cycle four African countries, 
including Zimbabwe, witnessed a decline in the proportion of female representatives. Thirty countries 
worldwide implement a form of gender quota. Beatrice Kiraso, a female Ugandan MP, has stated that 
quotas “kick start the process” of increasing women’s participation in national politics.254 However, as 
Mata Sy Diallo, a former female vice-president of the Senegalese National Assembly, has observed, “it is 
not a cure for the makings of a true democracy.”255 Many have pointed out that a transitory quality should 
be included in the fashioning of a quota system.
The use of reserved seats first emerged in the 1930s and 1940s in Britain. The British used this system to 
allocate seats in its governing councils to Hindus and Muslims, and eventually to European planters and ex-
patriots.256 Previous notions of having reserved seats for one or few women, representing the vague and all-
embracing category of "women", are no longer considered sufficient.257 Moreover, the distinction between 
the quota system and reserved seating arrangements is increasingly blurred. One definition provides that 
reserved seats set aside a certain percentage of seats for individuals representing a defined group rather than 
setting aside candidate positions. 258 In any case it appears that albeit two, artificial distinctions may be 
discerned. Reserved seats are seen as less progressive, typically allocating a less significant, though perhaps 
no less meaningful, number of seats to a designated group.259  The second distinction is that reservations 
generally are associated with ethnic or cultural cleavages, while quotas are associated with women.260 This 
distinction does is not hold true across the board. For example, Uganda reserves one seat from each of its 
39 districts for women, Tanzania reserves 63 out of 295, and Eritrea reserves 33 of 150 seats.261 Burkina 
Faso262and Rwanda apply similar provisions. 263 Uganda also reserves seats in parliament for youth, the 
disabled, salaried workers and the army.264 Ethiopia, Mauritius and Niger each reserve seats for national 
ethnic minorities.265 Given this negotiable distinction in terminology, these two mechanisms will be treated 
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the same for purposes of this analysis. This mechanism will be broadly characterized here as a de facto or 
legal or mechanism guaranteeing a minimum number of parliamentary seats to a marginalized group.
TABLE 3: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GUARANTEED PARLIAMENTARY SEATS 
Pro Con
• Compensates for barriers that 
prevent equitable representation
• No discrimination
• More than one delegate for a given 
marginalized group removes 
pressure from a single token 
representative
• Need for diverse perspectives 
• Elections are more about 
representation and not educational 
qualification
• Qualifications attributable to unique 
experiences of disenfranchised 
groups are viewed as less significant 
in majoritarian system 
• Political parties mainly control 
nominations, not voters
• Conflicts surrounding quota system 
subside over time
• Quotas are temporary and removed 
after historical disadvantages are 
remedied
• Lends preference to one group over another, 
violating the principle of equality
• undemocratic, as voter is unable to decide who 
will be elected
• Exclude qualified candidates because they do not 
fit the appropriate gender role
• People do not want to be elected because of their 
affiliation with a specific group
• Create internal party tensions and ill feelings 
toward those who are included based on quota266
•  “Would you then say that 10 percent of the 
cricket team should be white and the rest black 
because that is the make up of the nation? You 
would not, because everyone wants to play 
cricket.” Chief Whip Douglas Gibson of the 
Democratic Alliance in South Africa.267
• Gender quotas may be mistaken for a “glass 
ceiling”268 or unacknowledged discriminatory 
barrier that prevents women and minorities from 
rising to positions of power or responsibility269
Guaranteed Parliamentary Seats: Country Examples
South Africa
At the end of apartheid in South Africa, the African National Congress, the nation’s largest and most 
influential political party, adopted a quota for women to increase their representation within the party.270
Section 60 of South Africa’s Constitution requires that each province’s delegation to Parliament include 
three special delegates whose selection is defined by national legislation, and “must ensure the participation 
of minority parties in both permanent and special delegates.”271 While the constitution specifies that 
national legislation must be established to address the issue of minority quotas, tailored national legislation 
does not appear to yet have been created. A more formalized quota system is also applied in South Africa’s 
municipal elections.
Malawi
The Constitution of Malawi, Chapter 6, section 62 (1) states that the National Assembly will represent 
every constituency in Malawi and that the Electoral Commission shall determine the formula for 
calculating the number of seats for each constituency.  The Constitution provides for greater specificity 
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regarding the composition of the Senate. The Senate is to consist of 80 members, one elected Senator and 
Chief from every District and 32 additional senators determined by the Senate who will elect and nominate 
the remaining 32 senators from each group enumerated in section 68 (1)(c). Specifically, interest groups, 
societal groups and religious groups are identified as being worthy of representation in the Senate. More 
specifically, they are to hail from groups including women’s organizations, the disabled, farming and 
business sectors, trade unions, persons recognized as being “outstanding” contributors to society in the area 
of social, cultural or technological development of the nation, and every major religious faith in the 
country.  The procedure for filling these seats is as follows:  A Nominations Committee, is established 
within 45 days of each local government election. This Committee consists of the Speaker of the National 
Assembly, the Ombudsman and seven elected Senators appointed to the Nominations Committee on a 
motion by the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Nominations Committee is charged with ensuring, 
whilst it considers nominations for the aforementioned 32 Senate seats, that the Senate proportionally 
represent the different factions of the Malawian society, including an equitable gender balance.272
Kenya
Kenya is currently undergoing an expansive constitutional review process. The issue of how to best 
represent marginalized peoples is a topic of much debate, yet no clear consensus has emerged on this issue 
to date. As it stood in 2002, The Kenyan Constitution designated 12 reserved seats in the National 
Assembly to be filled by representatives of ‘special interests’, such as minorities or professions. These 
representatives were to be appointed by the elected members of the National Assembly.273 A 1997 
constitutional amendment provided that nominations would be weighed proportionally to each party’s 
elected seats in the National Assembly.274 In making their nominations, parties had to observe the principle 
of gender equality. 
The nomination process was often justified based on ensuring minority representation or securing the 
participation of individuals with special skills or experiences who were otherwise unwilling to compete in 
elections. However, Ghai has concluded that little evidence points to the mechanism being used to this end. 
Candidates defeated in elections or otherwise active in politics have been appointed to the National 
Assembly through the nomination procedure.275 Over time, use of the nomination mechanism as a backdoor 
for failed candidates caused the system to become delegitimate.  
Though this mechanism lost credit with the Kenyan population, during discussions for the creation of the 
new Kenyan Constitution delegates advanced arguments in support of special representation as a means of 
ensuring representation for marginalized groups. Hon. Delegate Charles Lwanga, advocating on behalf of 
affirmative action, spoke about the Ogiek people who have a population of 5000-10,000 people, and lack 
effective representation. He stated that if a party list were drawn, the Ogiek would be left without 
representation. In Lwanga’s eyes, this was reason enough to ensure that a number of seats should be set 
aside for minorities.276 Hon. Delegate David M Gitari supported the portion of the draft constitution 
involving the representation of women and a more broadly construed concept of marginalized people. He 
argues that a third of the parliamentary seats should be allocated to women.277 The previous Kenyan 
parliament had six or seven women and currently there are 17 female representatives.278 “If we leave them 
to compete with men, I think history has shown that they will still be marginalized in one way or another. 
Marginalization is not merely for pastoralists, slums in the city of Nairobi hold marginalized people 
without clean water or decent sanitation.”279
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Moving beyond consideration of these protective mechanisms, some delegates articulated practical 
measures designed to ensure more equitable representation. Hon. Delegate Luseno Liyai suggested that in 
the interest of affirmative action, 5% of the seats in the National Assembly, Devolved Governments280 and 
8.5% in the Senate, should be reserved for special interest groups, including persons with disabilities, the 
youth, labor organizations and other minorities and at least one third of the seats should be held by the 
marginalized gender.281 Liyau also spoke of extending the principle of maintaining at least one third 
affirmative action seats for the marginalized gender to the Senate and the Devolved Governments and 
ensuring that at no time would one gender be permitted to have more than a two thirds of majority.282 The 
concept of two thirds representation as a ceiling did not fair well and was subject to much criticism.  The 
Review Committee concluded that reservation of seats for women and special interest groups was a 
superior system and that the previously discussed mixed member proportional representation system would 
be dropped.283
New language was recently introduced to amend the 2004 draft constitution. The proposed amendment to 
article 83 (1)(b) states that “not less than two and not more than ten other members, at least one-third of 
whom shall be from the marginalized gender and one tenth from persons with disabilities.”284 The outcome 
of these deliberations remains uncertain and a final new constitution for Kenya has not yet been 
accomplished. Given the limited nature of this assignment, arguments against having a form of special 
representation being integrated into the Kenyan constitution are not been discussed here. Suffice it to say 
that most participants favored the idea of guaranteeing seats for specified marginalized groups and that the 
focus rested on the best way to achieve this goal rather than debating the merits of its inclusion. 
BOX 4: Inadequate Representation of Women in Kenya: Problems & Solutions
From independence until 2001, 10 women in Kenya were elected to the National 
Assembly and only eight served as nominated members.285 Currently 16 women hold 
seats in the National Assembly.286 Several problems were identified by Ghai as giving 
rise to the difficulty in increasing representation of women in the Kenyan Parliament. The 
first obstacle is traditional prejudice against women. Ghai argues that by enabling 
participation of women through constitutional provisions, the constitution itself can 
reduce prejudice. The second barrier is that political parties are reluctant to nominate 
female candidates. Mandating parties to nominate a prescribed number or proportion of 
female candidates or adopting an electoral system where parties have incentive to adopt 
this practice can help to overcome this obstacle. The last representational hurdle is that 
voters are reluctant to elect women. To this, Ghai responds by embracing the PR electoral
system. Proportional representation systems are believed to be more effective than 
majoritarian systems for electing female candidates – and the larger the constituency the 
better. It has also been observed that urban constituencies return more female 
representatives than rural ones.287
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Article 54(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia states that “Provisions 
shall be made by law for special representation of minority Nationalities and Peoples.” Section 3 further 
provides that there shall be no more than 550 Members of the House and that such members shall be based 
on population size and special representation of minorities. The constitution creates seats for a minimum of 
20 people representing minority “Nationalities and Peoples”, however the details of this system have yet to 
be clarified or entrenched in law. Part II Article 61(2) of the Constitution, referring to the makeup of the 
members of the House of the Federation, states “Each National, Nationality, and People shall be 
represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be 
represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population.”288
Ethiopia’s lower house, the Yefedereshn Mekir Bet or Council of the Federation, currently has 117 
members, one delegate from 22 minority nationalities and one from each professional sector of the 
remaining nationalities designated by regional councils which may elect them directly or provide their 
direct elections.289
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso, like most African nations is wrought with a history of patriarchy and socio-cultural traditions 
condemning women to subservient and submissive roles. Evading such stereotypes has placed an undue, 
though inescapable, burden on female representation in Burkina Faso, as the stereotypes themselves 
effectively obstruct the emerging female political voice. Burkina Faso became independent in 1960. The 
following two decades saw four different constitutions and rule by military juntas. Although the principle 
of gender equality was present in the country’s framework, it only achieved constitutional status under 
Article 12 of the 1991 Constitution. Female representation has steadily risen in Burkina Faso. The first 
woman was elected to the legislature in 1977 and in 2002 eleven women accounted for nearly 10% of the 
legislative seats.290 This increase is in part attributed to the revolution of 1983 which expanded the reach of 
democracy in the country, and aspired to integrate women into all levels of the decision making process. In 
1992, the national legislature designated that the Assembly’s deputy-speaker or vice-president should be 
held by a woman (1999-2000 proved an exception).291 Currently a national legislative quota exists to 
reserve seats for female representatives.292 In 2002, the Parliament was modified from a bicameral to 
unicameral system with the National Assembly being designated the single legislative body.
Several challenges further impede the ability for women to succeed in political life of Burkina Faso. The 
country employs a proportional representation list electoral system. However, women are placed at the 
bottom of the list, giving them little opportunity for being elected. Moreover, these slots are open only after 
a woman overcomes the barrier of actually being placed on a party list. As Tiendrebeogo-Kaboret notes, 
because it is tradition for a woman, upon marriage, to move to the husband’s village, women effectively 
become outsiders, robbed of their connections to a home village that may have increased the likelihood of 
being nominated as a candidate on a party list. Education and economic disadvantages also contribute to the 
political hurdles women face. The literacy rate is approximately 15% and a mere 34% of girls have access 
to schooling. Moreover, literacy and personal autonomy are unwritten qualifications for holding public 
office, and are used to exclude women from parliament.293
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Rwanda’s lower house boats 49% female representatives, the highest percentage of any country in the 
world. The Constitution designates 24 of 80 seats as reserved for women. After the 2003 election (the first 
after the genocide), 39 of the 80 seats were held by women. Rwandan women lobbied, assisted in drafting 
the constitution and developed voting guidelines to ensure seats for women.294 These factors aided 
Rwandan women in securing parliamentary seats through the country’s seat reservation system. While 
women in Rwanda have improved their political position, pleas for special representation echoed by other 
marginalized groups such as the Batwa, a hunter-gatherer group making up the smallest ethnic population 
(approximately 20,000) in Rwanda, have been less successful.295 There is a void of available information 
on Batwa status. Though there appears to be no public policy response to the Batwa request for better 
representation, it should be noted that the Rwandan constitution forbids “any word or act deemed to 
promote ethnicity.”296
BOX 5: Outside of Africa: India’s Mechanisms for Castes and Tribes
Increased political representation for disadvantaged minorities in India has been shown to 
allow them greater influence on policy-making. In India, before every state election, 
specified jurisdictions are declared reserved for disadvantaged castes and tribes. Not less 
than 25% of all legislators in India at both state and national level come from reserved 
jurisdictions. Only members of a group designated to benefit from the reservation system 
can stand for election and the entire electorate votes over the same set of candidates. The 
effect of this system is altering legislator identity and increasing political representation 
afforded to minority groups in the legislature without diminishing voter identity. Article 
332 of 1950 Indian Constitution requires that state-level political reservation reflect the 
scheduled castes (16% population) and scheduled tribes (8% population) population in 
every state. These numbers can only be revised after new census estimates is provided. 
Two independent national-level commissions are responsible for implementing this 
mandate (Election Commission and the Delimitation Commission). However, while 
scheduled castes have emerged as an important political block in post-independence 
India, scheduled tribes remain politically marginalized.297 Pande’s main finding is that 
resources have been redistributed in favor of groups which benefit from political 
reservation, evidence that reservations can enhance group’s policy influence particularly 
on targeted redistribution.298
Mauritius
Mauritius is one of the two oldest and most successful democracies in Africa. In Mauritius, four of the 66 
seats in the National Assembly are reserved for the losing political parties to represent various 
constitutionally recognized ethnic minorities. These seats are appointed by the election commission. These 
minorities are Hindus, 52% of the overall population; Muslims, 16.6%; Chinese, less than 3%, and Franco-
Mauritian/Creole Christians some 2.9%.299 (See also discussion on constituencies in Mauritius).
Niger
The National Assembly in Niger has 83 members, eight of whom are members elected in single-seat 
national minority constituencies.300 Prior to multiparty elections in the 1990s, the National Movement for a 
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Society in Development party set aside five seats for women through the quota system adopted by the 
party.301 (see also discussion on constituencies in Niger)
Tanzania
The Tanzanian Constitution provides for special representation of women in Article 66(1)(b), of 
guaranteeing five seats in the House of Zanzibar 66(1)(c) and also 10 representatives to be appointed by the 
President to the National Assembly 66(1)(d). Article 78 (1) states that political parties are required to 
submit names of women to the Electoral Commission on the basis of proportional representation among the 
parties that secured seats in the National Assembly. With respect to women MPs, part 66(1)(b) provides 
that the percentage of women in parliament shall have a quota of at least 20% and increase “progressively” 
thereafter.302 There are multiple issues for which the electorate has expressed including the proposal to 
increase the number of presidential appointments. Female MPs are widely regarded as “token” members 
who take positions on issues based one what will secure their place on the party list. Complaints have also 
been lodged regarding the passive role female MPs.303
In Depth Look at Uganda
Britain colonized Uganda in 1894 and ruled until the country’s independence in 1962. After a number of 
coups, Idi Amin asserted control of the country. Amin’s rule spawned a violent wave of ethnic intolerance, 
including the banishment of 60,000 Asians. In 1980, this streak of abusiveness, continued under Obote’s 
rule, this time targeting Rwandan refugees. Ethnic tensions intensified and another coup ended Obote’s 
second regime in 1985. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) ruled Uganda through its platform of 
popular participation grounded in a “no party system of governance” that sought to eliminate pluralism. 
Although the NRM supported marginalized group rights, this concept was restricted to Asians and women. 
The NRM’s rule is not immune to opposition or violence. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is one 
principal opponent, and its roots may be traced to Christianity and traditional religions and the Allied 
Democratic Front (ADF), which is comprised of Salaf Muslims and former Ugandan soldiers. Though it is 
understood that each government has accepted ethnic diversity, it is also clear that each ruling party has 
sought to promote its own ethnic group by oppressing other ethnic groups. 304
“Individual merit” has been considered the prerequisite for individuals to participate in Ugandan party 
politics. This dogma was in part aimed at drowning out ethnicity, religion and party politics as relevant 
issues that the NRM deemed as harms that create social divisions. Consequently the NRM banned 
independent political activities, thereby placing a stranglehold on rights of free speech, assembly and 
expression guaranteed by Uganda’s constitution. One Muslim Ugandan observed that when a member of a 
minority group tries to politically organize, they are deemed as opposition and therefore a “potential 
enemy” to the NRM.305 A major problem noted by Baker is that NRM policy recognizes two narrowly 
defined minorities. The first group is those individuals central to the NRM struggle and the second consists 
of “historical minorities” including “women and the disabled.” This definition significantly restricts the 
scope of Article 32 of the Ugandan Constitution (discussed below). These two groups have been given 
special legislative representation and subsequently they have gained greater economic and social power as 
compared to other marginalized peoples. Generally, minority groups are assumed to be represented by their 
county MP, however, this assumption is incorrect. For example, Asians and the Muslim Tabligh sect in 
Uganda have taken initiative to alter their historically disadvantaged standing, yet due to the restrictions 
placed on political power, these efforts have been of limited consequence.306
Article 78 (1) of the Ugandan Constitution provides that in addition to parliamentary members being 
directly elected by constituencies, the Parliament shall also consist of one woman for every district and 
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include representatives of the army, youth workers and persons with disabilities. Parliament has the option 
to add additional groups to this list, however this option has yet to be exercised. Article 73(2) goes on to 
establish a review clause for the special representation provision and the option to continue, increase or 
eliminate such representation for these groups. Initial review of the special representative provisions are to 
be accomplished in the tenth year after the establishment of the Constitution and every five years 
thereafter.307 The Constitution further provides for facilitating registration and voting for persons with 
disabilities.308 People with disabilities have representatives in Parliament from each of the four regions of 
Uganda. Women and youth also have special representation in Parliament. These representatives are 
elected through legally constituted Electoral Colleges.309 In addition to gender, youth and disability, the 
Constitution under Article 32 provides that the government may also adopt affirmative action policies to 
compensate historical wrongs or imbalances impending any marginalized group. This article also 
establishes the Equal Opportunities Commission to carry out the mandate of Article 32.310
Representation of marginalized groups in Uganda is not reflective of group needs or claims, nor does it 
effectively include members of marginalized groups in the legislative system.311 For example, the Batwa 
Pigmies, a landless group of about 3,000, are represented by individuals outside their group. In 2001, there 
were several Batwa representatives at the local level, though those individuals were among the more 
assimilated and not known to be advancing Batawa interests. Most Ugandans are unfamiliar with Batwa 
issues and stereotype them as being violent and secretive. Although the Tabligh Muslims in comparison to 
the Batwa they are an organized group with a louder more articulate voice, they consider themselves to be 
poorly represented and discriminated against.312 Baker observes that Uganda’s current system does not 
permit marginalized groups to express themselves through organized political parties since minorities 
cannot organize political parties. Uganda has some 56 ethnic groups classified by linguistic similarities 
scattered throughout the country. More than three quarters of Uganda’s population live in rural areas. While 
Article 36 of the 1995 Constitution guarantees minorities the right to participate in decision making and to 
have their views taken into account in the making of national plans and programs, this provision is 
continually disregarded.313
The arguments promulgated both in favor of and against special representation during the Uganda 
Constitutional Commission of May of 1993 illuminates some of the challenges in opting for special 
representation. Two central arguments opposing special representation reasoned that special interest groups 
would “debase” the core principle of democratic representation and that individuals belonging to special 
interest groups would be granted disproportionate representation as compared to the average person. 
Additionally, and perhaps articulating the most complex aspect of special representation, critics questioned 
where the line would be drawn?314  This issue raises itself repeatedly throughout the course of any special 
representation discussion, as the groups seeking such representation may indeed be endless and the 
objections to including a particular group may create additional political and social tensions. 
The military is one group advanced as a special interest group which continues to attract a great deal of 
controversy. Some Ugandans argued that for the 1995 Constitution to be effective, it was vital that the army 
be vested and committed to its success. These individuals understood the army to be a key force in securing 
the stability of the country in 1993, when constitutional Commission discussions transpired. They argued 
that for the Army to work as a partner with civilian authorities, rather than threaten stability it needed to be 
part of the decision-making process.315 In light of its role in Uganda’s turbulent history, granting special 
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representation to the army was understandably accompanied by much opposition.  During the 
Commission’s discussions, opponents questioned the army’s supposed neutral and apolitical position, and 
also expressed fear over any involvement in the legislative decision making body. 
The Uganda Constitutional Commission raised two points in favor of special representation. The first 
claimed that the establishment of special representation would guarantee different factions of society would 
support the new Constitution. Second, special representation could be used to correct the history of 
marginalization and exclusion of women, youth and workers from political and social life.316 In 1993, over 
50% of Uganda’s population were women and over 60% were youth. The “talent and wisdom” of these 
members of society was clearly lacking on the parliamentary level. The idea of using a special mechanism 
to represent these groups in the parliament was identified as but one means of addressing the problem of 
marginalization. However, it was also noted that such representation was not intended to be a permanent 
fixture of the legislative system. Rather, once the “fruits of special representation” broke down obstacles 
impeding disenfranchised groups,317 such mechanisms would become unnecessary.
Positive results have been associated with the NRM’s efforts to advance the role of women in parliament. 
The NRM is credited with leading efforts to place women in parliament. During debates over the 1995 
constitution, the NRM accepted a one-third reservation of seats for women on all local government 
councils in exchange for the political support of the Constituent Assembly Women’s Caucus on other 
issues.318  Currently, women hold 25% of the seats in the national parliament. As noted above, Uganda’s 
Constitution establishes quotas and reserved seats as a means of affirmative action and for redressing the 
historical disadvantages faced by women and the disabled. 
Byanyima, a female Ugandan MP, has commented that the NRM exhibited an early openness to discussing 
gender issues, despite the absence of “enlightened” gender perspectives at that time.319 However 
progressive Ugandan leadership has become, the rural and patriarchal parts of society remain opposed to 
progressive changes. Therefore, though women retain physical seats in parliament, they typically receive 
little support from their “progressive” male colleagues.320 Further, because women are elected by special 
districts, not interest groups as is the case for youth, workers and people with disabilities, women do not 
represent a specific female constituency. Some argue that this is problematic, insofar as the purpose of 
affirmative action is to “increase women’s voice in parliament” not to create special representation for 
them. Along these lines, female MPs do not consider themselves to be representing women’s issues nor are 
they held accountable to women.  In 2006, Uganda is expected to transition to a multiparty system.321
Guaranteed electoral seating inspires much debate and an equal amount of praise. While many agree that it 
is a quick and dirty way to infuse state parliaments with greater representativeness, the value of those 
representatives elected under this system remains questionable. As demonstrated from the cocktail of 
overviews, the structure of guaranteed electoral seats can be multifaceted. Adaptability to country specific 
issues appears to be the pearl inherent in this arguably favored mechanism. 
ADVISORY BODIES
Advisory bodies constitute another form of special representation. When discussed in terms of their 
relationship or role in a legislative capacity, they are generically defined as an independent body charged 
with consulting the legislature.322 However, these bodies usually have significantly less power than the 
lower house of a bicameral legislature. Though advisory bodies are presumably intended to be an integral 
part of the decision making process, in the African context, this does not appear to be the case. In Africa the 
role of an advisory body such as a house of traditional leaders or second chamber is typically restricted to 
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advising. The issues an advisory body consults the parliament on are unique to their individual mandate, 
though typically their focus is narrow in scope. The legislature may be obliged to consult the advisory body 
only on matters affecting the interests of groups represented by that advisory body.323 Alternatively, an 
advisory body may be required to initiate an investigation or present a report to the parliament.  In the case 
of many African nations, the advisory body represents marginalized groups from various segments of 
society such as indigenous people or tribes.324  Creating advisory bodies comprised of traditional leaders 
has been a transitional tool used to aid the democratic process while striving not to abruptly abandon and 
forsake traditional ways.325  Essentially, these institutions emerged as a form of integrating the old with the 
new. Second chambers are another form of advisory body. They are seen as a tool to provide the legislature 
with perspectives from a more representative cross-section of society. This type of body promises to 
improve integration and more accurately reflect the diverse views and needs of heterogeneous societies in 
the decision making process. Occasionally, as is the case in Botswana, the house of traditional leaders may 
also serve as the second chamber. 
The particular structure, representative capacity and authority assigned to an advisory body may vary 
widely across institutions. Members may be appointed or composed of elective representatives of various 
groups, as is the case with traditional leaders.326 Advisory bodies may originate from organic grassroots 
organizations or be created by constitutional mandate or legislative initiative. Societies employing these 
mechanisms may also opt to use any number of additional tools to enhance representational capacity.327
The examples below are used to illustrate methods establishing advisory bodies and elaborate upon their 
purpose, shortcomings and realm of influence. 
TABLE 4: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ADVISORY BODY
Pro Con
• Independent consultative body
• Legislature or executive consult or may be 
obligated to consult on specific matters
• Means for representing particular 
interests/issues, often those of 
marginalized communities
• Transitional tool used to facilitate moving 
to democratic process
• Improves integration of diverse views and 
needs in the decision making process  
• Fosters dialogue between different 
cultural/ethnic groups
• Increases value of decisions taken in 
parliament 
• Limited authority, usually narrow in scope
• Perpetuates and institutionalizes  archaic or 
“backwards” lifestyles 
• Members often are appointed, thereby 
compromising democratic function of 
system
• Legitimizes oppressive behavior and 
customs (ie. sexism, patrimonial/hereditary 
leadership)
• Representatives often fail to advocate on 
behalf of their constituency
• Considered discriminatory since privilege 
is awarded arbitrarily
• Ill defined duties of representatives
• Pervasive corruption 
Traditional Houses
The idea underpinning a house of chiefs is that all democracies have at least one house in their legislature 
representing all citizens on questions of national relevance. Some countries have a second house addressing 
more local interests. The house of chiefs (or house of traditional leaders) is intended to reflect local 
interests in the legislature.328 Indigenous and tribal groups are typically marginalized populations in large 
part due to a lack of infrastructure, resources and representation. Traditional houses are similar to second 
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houses and are ideally designed to respond to the needs of indigenous communities’ and advocate on their 
behalf. Traditional houses institutionalize forms of traditional governance and, under optimal conditions 
one of their functions is to foster dialogue between different ethnic groups.329 In this way, traditional houses 
may be a critical and effective tool in conflict resolution.330 Houses of Chiefs in Botswana, Ghana and 
South Africa are authorized to advise their respective governments on issues concerning customary rights 
and laws. Another way these representatives interact with government is through debate with state officials, 
civil servants and judges.331
Despite the optimistic potential of this mechanism, houses of traditional leaders and houses of chiefs are 
flawed in multiple ways. For example, because the title and power of chieftaincy is both hereditary and 
patriarchicical, it is seen as sexist. It is also thought to go against the democratic grain. In fact, the 
constitutional provisions, legislation and mere existence of these institutions are considered discriminatory 
since they function to afford certain articulated groups privileges on what is understood by some to be an
arbitrary basis. The responsibilities and duties of traditional leaders is in most cases ill-defined. In short, 
these systems are seen by progressives as “backwards”332 and reinforcing outdated lifestyles. Some factions 
of society simply wish the “old” ways would surrender to contemporary culture and view this institution as 
an enabling mechanism that perpetuates outmoded values. Leaders represented in these bodies are 
notoriously ineffective or unmotivated advocates for their constituencies. In fact, there are numerous 
instances of corrupt and self-indulgent behavior and an overall lack of effort to use this system to benefit 
tribal constituents.  
South Africa
Section 184 of the 1993 South African interim Constitution provided a much greater role for traditional 
leaders than the final 1996 Constitution. The 1993 Constitution established a Council of Traditional 
Leadership and created a framework under which it was to be shaped. This Council consisted of a 
chairperson and 19 representatives, who were to be elected by traditional authorities. In addition, the 
interim Constitution required that bills relating to traditional customs and laws be reviewed by the Council, 
which was armed with a delaying power that could temporarily suspend such bills from being established 
as law.333
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizes the role of traditional leaders334 and provides 
that legislation may create institutions at the local, provincial and national levels. Through these 
institutions, traditional ways of life may be represented and potentially integrated into decisions relating to 
matters of customary rights and laws.335 Specifically, section 211 (1) of the permanent Constitution 
recognizes the “institution, status and role” of traditional leaders, though it compromises the 1993 
provisions by subjecting the powers to the constitution336 and to subsequent legislation.337 Acknowledging 
the function of traditional leaders and including them in decisions affecting their respective communities 
may be understood as an effort by the drafters of the constitution to more gently transition from traditional 
power to modern democratic reform.338 However, the limiting clause has the effect of narrowing the 
capacity of traditional authority. While the extent of the “role and status” has yet to be defined with any 
meaningful precision, this situation has given rise to tension between traditional leaders and elected 
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officials.339 The most significant reduction in traditional authority (as compared to the 1993 Constitution) 
has  occurred at the national level, section 212(2)(a) of the final Constitution states the creation of a council 
of traditional leaders is optional and that national legislation “may”—but not must—provide for such a 
body.340 It is worthy to note that local tribal councils are established under schedule 6 section 25(1)(b) of 
the final Constitution. Another important clause to integrate into this analysis is the requirement that the 
courts apply traditional and customary laws when relevant. 
The Council of Traditional Leaders Act 1997 establishes the Council of Traditional Leaders in section 2(1) 
to sec 7(1) which declares that the role of the Council is to “promote the role of traditional leadership 
within a democratic constitutional dispensation and enhance unity and co-operation between the council 
and various houses and address areas of common interest.”341 Section 7 (2)(a) provides that the Council 
may advise the national government and make recommendations relating to matters of traditional 
leadership and customary law. It may also conduct its own investigations and advise the President on 
request.342  The Council of Traditional Leaders Amendment Act 1998 changed the Council’s name to the 
National House of Traditional Leaders.343
Interestingly, the 1996 Constitution fails to delineate the scope of traditional authority or ensure its 
integration into the decision making process. From one angle, these legal mechanisms and the institution it 
creates provide the building blocks for a venue within which traditional communities may exert greater 
influence over their destiny. (Despite this fact that there is no clearly articulated process carved out for their 
inclusion.) However, another perspective argues that the nature of the National House of Traditional 
Leaders appears to further marginalize the leaders and communities. In other words, the National House of 
Traditional Leaders is essentially prevented from influencing society at large. The body also remains 
patriarchical, and unwilling to alter this trait. For example, the House of Traditional Leaders rejected 
instituting a gender quota. However, it should be noted that two women from Kwazulu-Natal were recently 
appointed to be traditional leaders. 
Currently, traditional leadership is institutionalized at the local, provincial and national levels. The National 
House of Traditional Leaders consists of chiefs sent up from the provincial council. Six provinces (Eastern 
Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga and North West) have Houses of 
Traditional Leaders, which elect three members to be representatives in the National House.344 While 
National House is said to be loosing power, recent legislation appears to be increasing its embrace of 
customary norms.345  Mabutla has commented that “tribalistic ideology” remains the biggest threat to South 
African politics.
Uganda
Uganda has not created an advisory body of traditional leaders and in fact the constitution specifically 
limits any future political influence of these leaders.  Chapter 16 of Uganda’s Constitution recognizes 
traditional or cultural leaders. However, section 246(3)(e) provides that no traditional or cultural leader 
may take part in partisan politics. Section 246(3)(f) further narrows the authority of traditional or cultural 
leaders stating that such leaders may not exercise any legislative or other governmental powers.346 Much of 
the focus in this Chapter is placed on ensuring that the role of traditional or cultural leaders will be 
constitutionally constrained and that any power will not interfere with other rights accorded to citizens 
under the constitution. 
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Ghana
Chapter 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana guarantees the institution of “chieftaincy” and 
traditional councils.347 Negative rights are assigned to parliament, effectively limiting the legislature’s 
ability to revoke any constitutionally derived right of traditional leaders and further ensuring that no law “in 
any way detracts or derogates from the hour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.”348 This powerful 
constitutional language entrenches the function of traditional leaders. The National House of Chiefs does 
not have legislative power, though advises on all matters affecting the country’s chieftaincy and customary 
law.349 From a comparative constitutional law perspective, the following excerpt illustrates the important 
role ascribed to Ghana’s traditional leaders: 
Article 272 
The National House of Chiefs shall-
(a) advise any person or authority charged with any responsibility under this Constitution 
or any other law for any matter relating to or affecting chieftaincy;
(b) undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law with 
a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and 
compiling the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin;
(c) undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating 
those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful;
(d) perform such other functions, not being inconsistent with any functions assigned to 
the House of Chiefs of a region, as Parliament may refer to it. 
Moreso than other African constitutions, the Constitution of Ghana envisions a path for traditional leaders 
that both integrates the role of chieftaincies and traditional councils into society at large while preserving 
their unique traditional nature. The intricate structure of the House of Chiefs and the support the House 
receives from other wings of government firmly root this advisory body into Ghana’s governing system. 
Article 271 specifies that members of the National House of Chiefs shall be elected by the House of Chiefs 
of each region.350 The process is quite elaborate since there are hundreds of traditional councils which elect 
representatives to one of 10 Regional Houses of Chiefs. Of the members in the 10 Regional Houses, five 
from each are chosen to be representatives in the National Houses. The Ghanaian government also provides 
an administrative staff for the National House of Chiefs and has a Chieftaincy Division in the President’s 
Office.351
As mentioned above, one argument against traditional institutions is their inherently patriarchical and 
undemocratic nature. Women in particular have taken issue with the lack of gender equality in these bodies. 
These inequalities form a common basis for uniting in support of the women’s movement in Africa and for 
increasing equitable representation. In southern Ghana, however, women are better represented than in like 
systems across the continent.  “Queen mothers”, while not exactly representatives, are women who advise 
the Chiefs and are considered moral leaders of the community. While this role exists at the grassroots level, 
it has yet to penetrate into the upper echelons of the House of Chiefs’ hierarchy.352
Ghana’s National House of Chiefs has assumed an independent lobbying role in promoting long-term 
national interests, rather than the special interests advocated by upper houses in other African countries. It 
is also said to have played a critical role in helping to transition the country to democracy.353 Prompted by 
private investors wishing to purchase land in Ghana, the government undertook an analysis of property 
rights. In so doing, it requested the advice of the House of Chiefs, who in turn influenced the outcome of 
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the government’s decision to maintain the country’s system of property rights. The House of Chiefs 
reasoned that private land ownership would potentially create a landless class and ultimately prove 
“socially disruptive”.354
Botswana
Botswana is the oldest and most successful democracy in Africa. The nation has been independent and 
democratic since 1966.355 Like traditional leaders elsewhere in Africa, their leadership role is hereditary. 
Botswana’s House of Chiefs was established in the 1960s. It was created to marry the new with the old and 
gradually introduce ideas of western democracy.356 The institution is enshrined in Part III of the 
Constitution and the appointment of the chiefs is spelled out in the Chieftainship Act.357 The House of 
Chiefs deal with all customary matters like property, land change and other customary laws and rights. 
While the National Assembly is not required to consult the House of Chiefs on general matters, they are 
obliged to consult them on matters affecting customary laws and rights. However, the National Assembly 
may pass laws without their approval.358 In addition to their advisory role, members of the House of Chiefs 
also participate in the judicial system.359 The House of Chiefs in Botswana has the ability to increase 
government accountability through its power to compel a cabinet minister to answer questions about his or 
her government portfolio.360 Like Ghana, Botswana also has administrative offices designated to support 
the House of Chiefs.
Article 85 of the Constitution of Botswana details the tasks assigned to the House of Chiefs, with 
provisions similar to those contained in Ghana’s constitution. The House of Chiefs functions include the 
ability to address any matter within the country’s legislative or executive authority that it deems important 
to “take cognizance in the interests of the tribes and tribal organizations it represents and to make 
representation” to the President or National Assembly.361 Also included in this section is the foundation for 
the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the House of Chiefs and both the legislative and executive 
branches. The language here establishes the building blocks for a culture of inclusion and flexible. 
While the House of Chiefs institution appears well structured in Botswana, communities have expressed 
dissatisfaction with their representation. For example, one San female representative from the Chobe 
district is believed not to be voting on behalf of her San constituency.362 The House of Chiefs initially 
represented the eight principle tribes in Botswana. However, during the 1997 review process, communities 
expressed the need to increase the number of representatives in the House of Chiefs. Accordingly, in 2001, 
a constitutional amendment increased the number of representatives to 15.363 This number is still 
considered insufficient by some, specifically those excluded and those seeking an end to “racism”.364 The 
Basarwa, a San people, are a marginalized and scattered population of hunter-gatherers that complain of 
their lack of representation in the House of Chiefs and the fact that they are not acknowledged as a tribe.365
In 2000, President Mogae appointed a task force to review the House of Chiefs and its constitutional basis.  
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The ensuing White Paper on the Balopi Commission proposed to change several constitutional sections to 
make them “tribal neutral” however its recommendations failed to be implemented.366
The Second Chamber
The history of second chambers is intimately linked to conflict resolution. These chambers were construed 
as a way to balance cultural, ethnic and social instability.367 During a Seminar for Parliamentarians of West 
and Central Africa, participants addressed the question of the representative nature of parliaments. This 
proceeding stressed the importance for all sectors of society, particularly women and ethnic groups, to be 
involved in the decision-making process. Second chambers are established to help satisfy the need for 
better integrating different factions of society and making the shift towards modern democracy more 
gradual, as witnessed in Burkina Faso.368 Second chambers have also been identified as a type of think-tank 
that can function to increase the reliability of decisions taken by parliament.369 African second chambers 
are unique in that they are designed to account for “diverse social geography and the need to re-introduce 
equality via specific measures and adapted practices, in countries prey to social, racial and cultural 
imbalances.”370 For example, importance is given to representation of socio-professional categories in the 
Egyptian consultative assembly and the second chambers of Burkina Faso and Morocco.371 However, 
unlike second chambers elsewhere in the world, most of these bodies in Africa lack voting powers. The 
magnitude of power bestowed upon Ethiopia’s second chamber is extremely rare. African nations that boast 
bicameral systems include: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Namibia, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Swaziland.
Ethiopia
As stated previously, Ethiopia’s legislature is bicameral. The House of the Federation (Yefedereshn Mekir 
Bet), Ethiopia’s second chamber, has 112 members (71 of which are appointed by states and 41 are 
allocated according to population). Every “nation or nationality” has one seat per one million of its 
population.372 Composition of the House of the Federation is not rigid, election of its members may be 
direct or indirect and this decision lies with state councils. While this practice allows local nomination 
practices and elections of ethnic representatives to be tolerated it also leaves room for abuse. State councils 
are free to choose whether elections will be held or whether they will appoint House members. Juxtaposed 
with the trends of power dispossession linked to other second chambers in Africa, the House of the 
Federation remains relatively powerful and its duties are central to the function of the state. This institution 
is facilitating Ethiopia’s move towards democracy, though it remains necessary to have some measure of 
checks and balances installed to prevent abuse of power. Though the second chamber was created in 1994, 
it was not until 2001 that it gained resources and increased responsibility through a special government 
proclamation. This proclamation grew out of a power struggle in the ruling party and resulted in a scale 
back of power in the Prime Minister’s Office.373
Arguably, the House of the Federation has too many duties within its purview. It is responsible for 
interpreting the constitution, determining issues regarding the “rights of nations, nationalities and peoples 
to self-determination”, and is also charged with promoting unity through mutual consent. The House must 
also resolve disputes between states, divide federal and state tax revenues and set federal subsidies 
allocated to states. In addition, it is authorized to order federal intervention if any state violates the 
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constitution or endangers the constitutional order.374 Many societal and political changes have been 
attributed to the success of the House of Federation. For example, there has been an increase in debates and 
resolutions of intergovernmental conflicts and discussions on regional development policies and ethnic 
differences. In addition, the House of the Federation has created various groups to help manage “unity in 
diversity.” Moreover, the developments within the second chamber appear to be supported by the 
government at large.375
Burkina Faso
In December 1995, the constitutionally mandated second chamber of Parliament was installed, completing 
the government structure envisioned by the 1991 Constitution.376 The Chamber of Representatives is the 
upper house in parliament though its powers do not extend beyond an advisory role. It is comprised of 
representatives from all sectors of civil society, including traditional chiefs, NGOs and religious groups. 
For example, approximately 30 of the 150 seats in the upper house are allocated to civil society 
organizations representing from various special interest groups.377
Swaziland
British conquest of Swaziland in 1903 reduced the King’s role to that of a paramount chief. In 1968, the 
new Constitution declared the nation a “constitutional monarch”, and the King regained some of the 
original authority bestowed upon him. According to the 1968 Constitution, parliament was independent. 
However, in 1973 the King dismantled the parliament, abolished most of the constitution and banned all 
political parties.378  In 1978 the King an appointed a “Tinkhundla” (constituencies)379 parliament, however, 
its role was merely advisory. The Tinkhundla was organized by Regional Councils according to the four 
regions of the country; Hhohho, Manzini, Shishelweni and Lebombo. However, these Regional Councils 
were ineffective.380 One of the main problems with the Tinkhundla was attributable to the power imbalance 
between the Tinkhundla and the chiefs in Libandla.381 These chiefs were given the power of development 
as granted through the Swazi Administration Act 79/1950, direct access to the King and the duty of land 
allocation while members of the parliament appeared to be nothing more than talking heads.382
The 1968 Constitution and its 1978 and 1992 amendments provide for a bicameral Parliament with “equal 
powers to enact laws”. The House of Assembly consists of 65 members, comprised of 55 members elected 
from the 50 constituencies and 10 members appointed by the Head of State. The Senate is composed of 30 
members, 10 of whom are elected by the House of Assembly and 20 appointed by the King. The 1992 
Establishment of Parliament Order No.1 provides that those appointed by the Head of State in either 
Chamber include inter alia Chiefs and Members of the Royal Family383  both on a rotational basis, as well 
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as other special interests such as women, youth and members of religious groups based on their 
representation in either Chamber.384 In 1993 parliamentarians were directly elected by secret ballot, though 
experts ascribed little credibility to these elections. Further undermining this potential system of 
representation is the fact that people did not have the right to express complaints to their supposed 
representatives.385
Currently, Swaziland is undergoing a constitutional review process. However, critics of the draft 
constitution find its provisions will do little to improve on previous parliamentary has been in the 
performance. The design of the parliament is of particular concern as approximately one third of the body 
is appointed by the King. According to the proposed constitution, the parliament would consist of up to 31 
Senators, 20 of whom would be appointed, and no more than 76 members in House of Assembly or second 
chamber, 10 of whom would be appointed by the King.386 These figures reflect a slight increase in the 
members of both houses. Candidates in the House of Assembly are to be elected at the regional level by 
traditional local councils.387 An Electors and Boundaries Commission is established under Chapter VIII of 
the Draft Constitution with a mandate for reviewing the boundaries of tinkhundla areas. This same section 
further states that special representation will be provided for marginalized groups, with particular emphasis 
on representation for women. No particulars are detailed in this regard.388 Swaziland continues to be a no-
party state that outlaws political parties.389 This reality leads one to reasonably conclude that the process of 
representation is hampered and the ability of disenfranchised groups to express themselves through political 
activity is wholly inadequate. Referring to the Libandla as a legislative body appears to be a misnomer, as 
its law making function is artificial and it does not possess any independent power. In a 2003 survey, Swazi 
voters expressed the desire for “drastic” political change and a hunger for an accountable government.390
Malawi
Section 68-72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi called for the creation of a second chamber of 
parliament, or “Senate”.391 The Senate was intended to have 80 members comprised of one from each 
District, a Chief from each District, and 32 additional Senators that would be nominated from various 
societal groups. These 32 senators would represent women’s organizations, the disabled, individuals from 
the health, education, farming and business sectors and from trade unions, as well as individuals based on 
outstanding service to the public and religious affiliation.392 The Senate was designed to be part of a system 
of checks and balances, to scrutinize the National Assembly. However, the Senate was never established. In 
2001, the relevant constitutional sections were repealed, thereby effectively abolishing the idea of an upper 
house.393 Although society at large was opposed to this move the government repeatedly diverted funds that 
had been allocated for the purpose of setting up the senate.394
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Although little information on the effectiveness of advisory bodies exists, to date, these bodies do not 
appear to be the most useful or effective representation mechanism. Whether it is their historical grounding 
in executive manipulation, ill design or the lack of concrete power, of the three mechanisms discussed 
herein, appear advisory bodies to have the least amount of political influence and the least effective means 
to represent marginalized populations. That said, if constructed and empowered properly, advisory bodies 
may still serve a positive function. With greater authority and tools for advocacy, representatives may 
better carry out the will of otherwise unrepresented populations. Furthermore, it cannot go unnoticed that 
advisory bodies in Africa still reflect a sincere attempt to appeal to mentalities, lifestyles and organization 
of traditional communities. Indeed, both second chambers appear an authentic attempt to include local 
perspectives in decision making. However, when the very origin of advisory bodies and the constitutional 
provisions and legislation through which they were created ascribes narrow and irrelevant duties that may 
be overlooked, undermined or simply erased, then true purpose of their existence is brought into question. 
The trend in most African nations appears to increasingly diminish the importance of these bodies and to 
continue reducing their already minimal relevancy. Though promising in theory, advisory bodies seem to 
further incubate and foster mistrust in the legislature and offer little to their constituencies. Ideally these 
institutions should add an additional layer of integrity to the law making process and not serve to quiet 
disgruntled citizens left outside of the mainstream political process.
Important Components for Structuring Special Representation 
The three mechanisms discussed above are by no means exhaustive. Other mechanisms such as minority 
veto, special constituencies, national commissions, and ombudspersons395 are other tools that have been 
used to create and support special representation. Though historically, many of these mechanisms served to 
marginalize groups in the colonial era, they may now be employed to reverse the wrongs of the past and 
establish representational balance.
While no cookie cutter blueprint for constructing mechanisms of special representation exists, several basic 
principals may be derived from international law, African history and the common objectives of the various 
representational mechanisms. First and foremost, there must be recognition that people in a society are 
marginalized. It must be acknowledged that minority populations have been willfully or incidentally 
excluded from society and face discrimination at the hands of mainstream populations. It is necessary to 
recognize that minority views and needs are neither presented nor integrated in public discourse and lack 
meaningful avenues of expression. Recognition is the precursor to representing marginalized people. It is 
also necessary that there be an unambiguous definition of what groups are being referred to as 
marginalized.396 The ICCPR states that the existence of a minority classification is a matter of fact rather 
than law and should be based on objective criteria.397 Once a minority group has been identified, it is 
critical that earnest political will acknowledge and prioritize the need to take measures towards improving 
that group’s marginalized status. Given the history of corruption and skepticism of legislators among many 
Africans, the integrity of political will is a critical issue. Accordingly, at this stage a government may chose 
to pursue formalized mechanisms for special representation as a remedy for marginalization. 
There are several ways political will can be manifested. The most well-regarded measures include 
enshrining provisions in the constitution or enacting legislation. Ideally, a provision will be constitutionally 
entrenched and its particularities spelled out in legislation. The significance of constitutional provisions 
should not be understated. One delegate to the Constitutional Review in Kenya noted that “whether you are 
a majority or minority, the Constitution becomes a protecting tool for everybody so that we are all 
equal.”398 Another equally astute remark by Commissioner Mutakha Kangu resolved that: 
“Constitutionalism is more important than democracy, democracy should be looked at as 
just one aspect of Constitutionalim and if there are any circumstances under which 
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majorities can run away with power and minorities are left with nothing constitutionalism 
will step in and say no we must allow majorities their chance but we must also protect 
minorities.”399
Additional factors may influence the success of special representation mechanisms. Constitutional and 
legislative safeguards create basic rights and a foundation of trust in a society. They also serve to establish 
principles and processes to ensure the integrity of representation and confidence in the legislative system. 
Securing fundamental rights within the constitution promises the support and protection of efforts aimed at 
equitable representation. A freedom of speech clause is a vital component. At least 39 African constitutions 
have established a freedom of speech clause within their constitution but 14 remain silent on the issue.400
Equality and non-discrimination clauses are likewise critical constitutional components. Both are illustrated 
in the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights which provides: 
9 (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect 
or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may 
be taken.
9 (3) “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.
9 (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent 
or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
States may also ensure optimal conditions for voting through acts of legislation or within constitutional 
provisions. For example, they may establish political rights by making voting universal and secret,401 as 
well as establishing an electoral system and process to be implemented. They may similarly entrench 
minority rights and delineate mechanisms for minority representation. Stipulations may also assure physical 
and emotional security, economic resources, minimum levels of education and health as well as tolerance 
of opposing views.402 Accountability of representatives may be enforced through articulated rules and 
sanctions. Independent institutions and/or commissions may be set up to support or enforce these laws. To 
effectively implement special representation, minority rights must be secured. Promoting the richness of 
ethnic group values, combating political, economic and social exclusion and respecting the rights of ethnic 
groups in all matters in line with the fundamental rights articulated in international law is a necessary and 
minimum step.403 Ultimately, constitutional, legislative or institutional mandates must be insulated by well 
structured rules and regulations that are sufficiently tailored to cater to the particular needs of a given 
society.  
Ideally, special representation is a stop-gap measure. Many assert that measures must be temporary and 
mechanisms abandoned once the marginalized group achieves effective representation. As Kymlicka states:
“In so far as these rights are seen as a response to oppression or systematic disadvantage, 
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they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the 
need for special representation no longer exists… society should seek to remove the 
oppression and disadvantage, thereby eliminating the need for these rights”.404
The ultimate yardstick for success of whichever mechanism is instituted is that the marginalized group and 
society at large will no longer have a need for it to exist. In other words, when marginalized interests are 
represented and integrated into mainstream decisions and national policymaking processes,405 there will be 
no need for special representation mechanisms—at that time everyone will be seen as an equal.
Overcoming the Problems Associated with Special Representation
Numerous problems identified in this report underscore the shortcomings of existing special representation 
mechanisms to effectively to improve the situation of marginalized peoples. The following thoughts are 
meant to provoke discussion and raise questions as to whether these obstacles are insurmountable and how 
mechanisms might be reconceptualized and improved upon.
Special representation has been attacked for being undemocratic. When the essence of a representational 
democracy is explored, one uncovers a system whereby representatives are elected by the people to make 
decisions on their behalf. Therefore, special representation may be understood as furthering democratic 
goals and principals by ensuring that all people are represented, particularly those who have traditionally 
been excluded from representation.  An issue that must be dealt with simultaneously is how to ensure that 
non-minority groups remain engaged in the political process and do not become disenchanted by special 
representation. The challenge is how to construct and define these mechanisms so they are understood as 
contributing value to the whole of society. To this end, relevant regulations and constitutional provisions 
should include specific language to this effect. Public education can also be used to reinforce this policy 
purpose. 
Decline in legislator quality, bias of legislators, preference in favoring special interest groups over the good 
of the whole and the willingness of legislators to bargain along identity lines are only a few of the potential 
issues that arise when representatives are elected through special mechanisms. Dealing with the earnestness 
of legislators is an understandable concern and the issue must be confronted in the design of the specific 
mechanism. There is endless space for innovation in creating the rules that would govern the electoral 
system and the mandate of elected representatives. In addition, independent bodies could support the 
integrity of the system. For example public interest groups, national commissions and media may be used 
to keep representatives in line. Additionally, sanctions against representatives who fail to fulfill their 
mandate should be established as a matter of law and enforced by a nonpartisan judiciary. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Africa is the entrenched skepticism towards awarding a special 
privilege to any group over another. Particularly with the regional goal of a unified African identity, one 
might question how special representation may be accomplished. Meaningful efforts to achieve unification 
must first listen to and address the problems linked to societal cleavages, thus making representational 
issues part of the wider African goal of unity. Marginalized people must first be accepted and included in 
the societies in which they live before they may see themselves as part of a unified nation. This report has 
not found any evidence indicating that special representation mechanisms lead to a rise in tensions between 
groups. More accurately, they lead to additional groups pleading to be included within the special 
representation framework. To avert a floodgate scenario, existing and new mechanisms may create an 
objective and evenhanded, yet still flexible, list of criteria with which to evaluate group claims. Creating 
group qualifications with the use of neutrally acceptable terms, like Botswana’s rural area dwellers 
classification, may also help to sidestep issues of ethnic conflict. Additionally, a rotational quality may 
compliment the instrument by providing future marginalized communities with an entrenched mechanism
guaranteeing a just opportunity.406 This mechanism it could be structured in such a way whereby when one 
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marginalized group cycles out of the system, if need be, another group may fill its place. This may be used 
as a way to ensure priority to the most marginalized populations while preserving representational 
opportunities for other groups in the future.
Africa is faced with immense challenges across a number of issue areas. Indeed, for special representation 
to foster meaningful change, it must be accompanied by systems of social and economic reform. It seems 
shortsighted to suspend political issues until problems of poverty, education and sanitation are eradicated. 
A more prudent and realistic strategy is to embrace the interconnectedness of these matters and realize the 
potential for creative, interconnected solutions. To be certain, legislative mechanisms are but one, albeit a 
profoundly significant, angle from which to approach better representing interests of disenfranchised 
people. In fact, such mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can exist in tandem with executive, 
judicial and other tactics. 
Policy Recommendations
This report has surveyed a number of African states to gain a better understanding of the four most 
frequently used legislative special representation mechanisms. The following suggestions reflect broad 
ideas that offer to contribute to the advancement of special representation systems. These suggestions 
encompass areas for future projects that may contribute to enhancing opportunities for expression and 
participation among marginalized groups in African societies and thereby help move nations towards 
becoming more equitable and just societies.
• Conduct more comprehensive field based study on special representation. Focusing on the 
impact of existing mechanisms and examine relevant judicial rulings, legislative acts as well as 
notable improvements where mechanisms exist, the impact on society at large and any related 
negative repercussions.
• Work with African and international partners to create a knowledge bank of mechanisms 
for special representation. 
• Design and compile an online warehouse of country specific regulatory and constitutional 
language, supporting institutions, tactics and successful strategies used to advance special 
mechanisms (including their implementation and enforcement), statistical and other 
accomplishments, references to supporting organizations, and related data. 
• Build coalition to draft and publish an advisory booklet on special representation 
mechanisms for African governments including:
o Recognizing marginalized groups (specifying neutral and objective criteria that may be 
used for determining minority status) and rethinking the way these groups are perceived; 
o Sample legislation and other legal means for enhancing systems of special representation;
o Encourage NEW and innovative ideas to fit the needs of each society (as recommended 
in the Lund Recommendations407);
o Training guides for legislator; and
o Examples of sanctions that may be adopted and enforced if and when legislators violate 
code of conduct (ineffective representation, corruption, bribery, etc.)
• Encourage inter-African governmental dialogue on issues of special representation 
• Lobby for educational directive to include teaching tolerance, cultural awareness, knowledge of 
a country’s system of governance, and ways individuals can become politically engaged. 
• Foster institutional support outside the legislature, including roundtables for drafting 
legislation on how to carry out constitutional mandates 
Concluding thoughts
Positive things are happening. Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Zambia each held multi-
party elections where an incumbent regime was defeated and peacefully handed over the reigns of power.408
407 See supra note 28.
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The National Constitutional Review Process occurring in Kenya has made efforts to involve most 
“minority groups” and is striving to offer opportunities to redress previous imbalances through affirmative 
action, gender equality, free and compulsory primary education, and devolution of power to lead regions on 
human rights issues, the environment, land rights and cultural reforms.409 Women in Mozambique, 
Namibia, South African and Uganda fill over 25% of the seats in their respective national parliaments. 
That many countries in Africa and around the world employ special mechanisms to give voice to 
marginalized peoples evidences a need that has given way to a rising and hopeful trend. The African 
experience underscores the fact that no absolute formula for special representation exists. Rather 
mechanisms must be built to fit the unique historical and present context of each country. That said, each of 
these mechanisms also must satisfy the standard of being well-articulated and malleable.  Similarly, the 
temporary nature of such mechanisms must be ensured to preemptively address the concern of creating 
disproportionate representation, new tiers of privilege and future conflict. To be meaningfully successful, 
these tools must also be part of a broader holistic approach to securing better representation for the 
disenfranchised. In this respect, willful leadership, supporting institutions, constitutional and legislative 
measures and enforcement each have a role to play. This paper offered a peripheral overview of 
constitutions and other data, yet did so from a distance. A closer, on the ground examination of special 
representation is necessary to more accurately evaluate the status of existing mechanisms and determine 
where room for improvement exists. 
Several assumptions or observations may be associated with each mechanism and the opportunities under 
which they may prove most popular. Proportional representation is most often associated with better 
representation of political parties enabling groups outside the status quo to find a means for expression in 
parliament. The true nature of a population is more often reflected in a PR system and though this system is 
not restricted to any particular classification, groups are often organized around a shared ideology or 
ethnicity.  Conversely, quotas and reserved seats are respectively linked to more equitable representation of 
gender and ethnicity. These methods for manipulating the electoral system represent common tools for 
rapidly encouraging diversity in the legislature. In a similar manner, advisory bodies are often used to 
ensure that traditional and local ways of life are preserved in modern systems of governance. Though not 
exclusively, many advisory bodies echo customary norms and lend a historical and organic balance to—
often externally introduced—institutional change. If infused with integrity and given genuine 
representational authority, these bodies also reflect geographically diverse interests and may feed local 
sentiments into the national agenda. Finally constituencies are principally connected to ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status. While many boundary demarcations have remained essentially static since colonial 
times, they still serve as a useful form through which a political party may target their campaign, align their 
political priorities and harness support for elections. The increasingly efforts to redraw district lines offers 
hope of greater balance either with an eye towards more equitable population distribution or as a means for 
temporarily boosting representation for those groups living on the margins of society.
On the whole, proportional representation and guaranteed electoral seats are more common and effective 
means by which nations have opted to redress marginalized peoples. In contrast, advisory bodies appear to 
have far less credibility and are much more easily manipulated by executive powers. The redrawing of 
electoral districts must be further explored in order to provide a meaningful assessment.
Each special representation mechanism offers valuable insights into the questions of minority rights yet 
additional study is required for determining their value with regard to long term democratic development in 
Africa. Guaranteeing parliamentary seats, for example is a concept familiar to the women’s movement. The 
literature on mechanisms used to push women’s representation is much more impressive than that of other 
disenfranchised groups.  The voices and abilities of other marginalized groups may be enhanced by 
learning from the lessons, techniques and accomplishments of the international and Pan-African women’s 
fight for increased representation. In a similar manner, the emergence of the advisory body model be used 
as a paradigm for merging traditional forms of governance with modern innovation. By further dissecting a 
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country’s electoral system and its affects we may better understand how to create a structure that will be 
ever more inclusive and promising to future generations. Finally, collecting and analyzing census data may 
inform effort to draw district lines that support the notion of equitable representation.
To be certain, many of the endemic inequalities found within the African context existed before the 
introduction of any special representation mechanisms. Special representation played no role in ostracizing 
groups with like ancestry, physical features or spiritual beliefs. However, special representation 
mechanisms may play a critical role in redistributing opportunities of expression and including 
marginalized communities in society. In an ideal world these tools would be superfluous. But in our world 
the scales of democracy need tipping towards equality.
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Appendix A: Electoral Systems and Advisory Bodies of the Africa
Country
Electoral system of 
unicameral legislature or 
lower house of bicameral 
legislature
Advisory Bodies: 
Second Chamber 
(upper house)/House of 
traditional leaders
# reps
Algeria List PR Second chamber 430
Angola List PR 220
Benin List PR 83
Botswana First-past-the-post House of Chiefs (also the Second chamber) 47
Burkina Faso List PR Second chamber 111
Burundi List PR 81
Cameroon First-past-the-post 180
Cape Verde 
Islands List PR 79
Central African 
Republic
First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 85
Chad First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 125
Congo 
(Brazzaville)
First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 125
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic)
First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 210
Djibouti First-past-the-post/ party block 65
Egypt First-past-the-post/ two-
round system
Second chamber 444
Eritrea List PR 130
Ethiopia First-past-the-post Second chamber 547
French Guiana First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 19
Gabon First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 120
56
Gambia First-past-the-post 36
Ghana First-past-the-post National House of Chiefs 200
Guinea First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 114
Guinea-Bissau Lists PR 100
Ivory Coast First-past-the-post/ party block 175
Kenya First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 188
Lesotho First-past-the-post Second chamber 65
Liberia List PR Second chamber 64
Libya PR --
Madagascar List PR/combination system 138
Malawi First-past-the-post 177
Mali First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 147
Mauritania First-past-the-post/ two-
round system
Second chamber 79
Mauritius First-past-the-post/ party block 70
Morocco First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 222
Mozambique List PR 250
Namibia List PR Second chamber 72
Niger First-past-the-post 83
Nigeria First-past-the-post Second chamber 593
Papua New 
Guinea First-past-the-post 109
Réunion 
(France)
First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 44
Rwanda First-past-the-post 70
Sao Tomé and List PR 55
57
Principe
Senegal First-past-the-post/ party block 120
Seychelles First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 33
Sierra Leone First-past-the-post 68
Somalia First-past-the-post 123
South Africa First-past-the-post/ 
combination system
National House of 
Traditional Leaders 400
Sudan First-past-the-post 275
Swaziland First-past-the-post Second chamber 55
Tanzania First-past-the-post/ 
combination system 232
Togo First-past-the-post/ two-
round system 81
Tunisia First-past-the-post/ party block 163
Uganda First-past-the-post 214
Zambia First-past-the-post House of Chiefs 150
Zimbabwe List PR 120
* List of advisory bodies is not intended to be all inclusive.
Sources: World Policy Institute, “Electoral Systems of the World” 
<http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/democracy/table-pr.html> (14 May 2004);
Bruch et al., tables 1& 2, forthcoming [check for permission to site]; Jose de Araújo, 
“Legislative Branch”, http://www.chame.com.br/world/legislative.html> (25 July 2004).
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Appendix B: Ethnic Reservations
Country Reservation System in 2003
Burundi * 60% of National Assembly Tutsi and 
40% Hutu and 50% of Senate each Hutu 
and Tutsi
Ethiopia 22 of 117 seats in upper house reserved for 
representatives of minority nationalities 
Mauritius 8 of 70 seats reserved for “best losers” 
representing four constitutionally-
recognized ethnic communities
Niger 8 of 83 seats reserved for representatives of 
national minorities 
Zimbabwe * 10 seats unofficially reserved for whites 
and 10 seats occupied by traditional chiefs 
of the 150 seats in parliament 
Sources: CIA Factbook; Howard Wolpe. Telephone interview, 7 April 2004. 
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Appendix C: Quota systems and Statistic of Female Parliamentarians
Country Quota for 
Women
Seats in lower 
house of 
Parliament as 
of April 2004
Seats filled 
by women
% of Women 
in Parliament
Rank by IPU 
(compared to 
global 
statistics)
Rwanda Constitutional 
Quota, 
Election Law 
Quota 
80 39 48.8 1
South Africa Political 
Party Quota
400 131 32.8 12
Mozambique Political 
Party Quota
250 75 30.0 15
Seychelles * National 
Legislative 
Quota
34 10 29.4 16
Namibia 72 19 26.4 20
Uganda Constitutional 
Quota, 
Election Law 
Quota 
304 75 24.7 26
Eritrea Constitutional 
Quota
150 33 22.0 30
United Republic 
of Tanzania
Constitutional 
Quota, 
Election Law 
Quota 
295 63 21.4 32
Guinea Political 
Party Quota
114 22 19.3 41
Senegal Political 
Party Quota
120 23 19.2 42
Burundi 179 33 18.4 46
Botswana Political 
Party Quota
47 8 17.0 52
Angola * Political 
Party Quota
220 34 15.5 55
Sierra Leone 124 18 14.5 57
Gambia 53 7 13.2 61
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
500 60 12.0 68
Zambia * National 
Legislative 
Quota
158 19 12.0  “
Burkina Faso * National 
Legislative 
Quota, 
Political 
Party Quota
111 13 11.7 69
Lesotho 120 14 11.7  “
Tunisia Political 
Party Quota
182 21 11.5 70
Djibouti Election Law 65 7 10.8 72
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Quota 
Morocco Election Law 
Quota,  
Political 
Party Quota
325 35 10.8  “
Swaziland 65 7 10.8  “
Mali Political 
Party Quota
147 15 10.2 78 
Zimbabwe 150 15 10.0 79
Sudan Election Law 
Quota 
Regulation
360 35 9.7 82
Ghana 200 19 9.5 83
Malawi 193 19 9.3 85
Gabon *National 
Legislative 
Quota
119 11 9.2 86
Sao Tome and 
Principe
55 4 9.1 87
Cameroon * Political 
Party Quota
180 16 8.9 88
Congo 129 11 8.5 90
Cote d’Ivoire * Political 
Party Quota
223 19 8.5  “
Ethiopia 547 42 7.7 93
Togo 81 6 7.4 94
Benin 83 6 7.2 95
Kenya Constitutional 
Quota, 
Political 
Party Quota
224 16 7.1 96
Algeria 389 24 6.2 97
Nigeria 359 24 6.1 98
Chad 155 9 5.8 101
Mauritius 70 4 5.7 102
Liberia 76 4 5.3 104
Madagascar 160 6 3.8 109
Mauritania 81 3 3.7 110
Niger Political 
Party Quota
83 1 1.2 118
Papua New 
Guinea
109 1 .9 119
*indicates cell contains 2003 information
Sources: International Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliament 30 June 2004, 
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> (25 July 2004); International IDEA and Stockholm University, 
“Global Database of Quotas for Women”, 2003
 <http://www.quotaproject.org/system.cfm> (25 July 2004); Mona Lena Krook, “Not All Quotas Are 
Created Equal: Trajectories of Reform to Increase Women’s Political Representation”, March 2003,
http://www.quotaproject.org/Conference_papers/Krook_2003.pdf> (25 July 2004);
